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Manumission with Paramone: Conditional Freedom? 
 
ABSTRACT: A common view holds that slaves freed on condition of paramone were juridical 
halfings, legally half-free, half-slave. This paper argues that this view is based on a 
misunderstanding of the Greek sources, mainly epigraphic; that the intermediate or hybrid juridical 
state of conditional freedom is a modern invention; that the evidence for manumission in the Greek 
world suggests overwhelmingly that polities constructed liberty and slavery as a binary pair, rather 
than poles on a spectrum. 
 
“Next to paganism, the institution of slavery is probably the most difficult feature of ancient life for a 
modern student to understand.”1 Manumission with it. From Delphi alone, some 1000 inscriptions attest 
to over 1200 manumissions (ca.200 BC-ca.100 AD).2 Inscriptions from Boiotia, Phokis, Thessaly, 
Macedonia, Bouthrotos, Kalymna, Lemnos, and elsewhere offer hundreds more. Scholarly attention has 
fallen heavily on Delphi, where manumission is held to have worked roughly as follows. A slave 
somehow acquired enough money to purchase freedom. But since the slave was legally incapable of 
contracting the purchase, it, its owner, and the god engaged in a sham sale wherein the slave entrusted 
the sale (and funds) to Apollo, who bought the slave. This ‘sale’ in effect freed the slave. In roughly a 
third of known cases, the former slave was subject to paramone. This obliged her to ‘remain’ in service 
to her manumittor, in semi-slavery, free to go and yet required to remain in a state of conditional or 
partial freedom. Service was usually to conclude upon the former master’s death, at which point the 
freedperson left this state of semi-slavery and became properly free. 
 Westermann and Finley “used this intermediate stage of conditional release to create the concept 
of a spectrum of statuses between slave and free. This idea seems now,” Hopkins could write in 1981, 
“to have won general acceptance among ancient historians and has undermined the old, strict dichotomy, 
slave-free.”3 A generation later, acceptance is widespread. A valuable monograph articulates a graded 
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spectrum of statuses in Classical Athens.4 A rich, comprehensive study of Greek manumission, the first 
such in English, concludes uncontroversially that: 
Manumission inscriptions that include paramone clauses and other conditions reflect the ambiguous status of 
manumitted slaves. The freed persons remained with their manumittors, served them as slaves, and were liable to 
corporal punishment and to revocation of their manumission should they fail to do as ordered. On the other hand, they 
were given their freedom, protected against re-enslavement by their manumittors’ heirs or any other person, and had the 
right to go wherever and do whatever they wished. Whatever we choose to call them—half-free, half-slave, both free and 
slave—it is obvious that slaves with deferred manumission were in state of servile dependence on their manumittors.5 
“[A] man who has been a slave is freed, but his freedom is partly withdrawn in the same action in which 
it is given to him;”6 he was welcome to go but required to stay, untouchable but subject to beating, free 
but not really. Slaves became “the nominal property of the god, with the understanding that Apollo 
would make no use of his right of ownership” so that “the right of ownership was transferred, by default, 
to the slaves themselves, who were then in possession of themselves—that is, free.”7 The sale was not a 
sale, the manumission not a manumission, for freedom somehow arose from purchaser’s waiver of 
rights. A slave but not really. “The juridical situation is confused, and the concrete circumstances belong 
somewhere in between slavery and liberty.”8 Bloch saw less confusion, suggesting briefly that since 
those who performed paramone were constrained in their movements, could be beaten, lacked property 
rights, and were generally deprived of family, they may simply have been slaves.9 But that view won no 
ground, and most have taken for granted the fundamental weirdness of the mechanism.10 The author of a 
forthcoming corpus of Delphic manumissions (CID V) notes that paramone “manifeste une certaine 
ambiguïté, puisque le statut juridique de l’affranchi se trouve en contradiction avec la réalité de sa 
situation.”11 
 This paper suggests that the law and the reality of manumission with paramone were simpler and 
more compatible than scholars have credited; that there were no juridical halflings, half-free, half-slave 
or otherwise; that the conditionally freed slave, as understood, is a modern invention. 
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Delphic Slave Sales 
Let’s begin with the Greek of these heavily formulaic texts.12 Sale without paramone could be simple 
(e.g. SGDI II 1825): 
 ἄρχοντος Ἀνδρονίκου μηνὸς Ἡραίου, βουλευόντων τὰν πρώταν ἑξάμηνον Εὐαγόρα, Καλλιμάχου τοῦ 
Βαβύλου, γραμ- 
 ματεύοντος  Εὐαγγέλου τοῦ Σωδαμίδα, ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἀπέδοτο Κλευπάτρα, Νικαρχίδας, Ἀριστόκληα τῶι 
Ἀπόλλωνι 
 τῶι Πυθίωι σῶμα γυναικεῖον ἇι ὄνομα Σωσιπάτρα τὸ γένος Σύραν, τιμᾶς ἀργυρίου μνᾶν τριῶν, 
4 καὶ τὰν τιμὰν ἔχοντι πᾶσαν, καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Σωσιπάτρα τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν, ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέραν 
 εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτον ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν πάντα βίον, ποιέουσαν ὅ κα θέλη καὶ ἀποτρέχουσαν ἇ κα θέλη. 
 βεβαιωτὴρ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τᾶς πόλιος· Ἐμμενίδας Καλλία. μάρτυροι· οἱ ἱερεῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος 
Ἀμύντας, 
 Ταραντῖνος καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες Εὐαγόρας, Καλλίμαχος, Εὐάγγελος, ἰδιῶται Μένης, Μνασίθεος, Εὐάγγελος 
Πάτρωνος, 
8 Δέξιππος, Τιμόκριτος. 
 
… [2] On the following conditions Kleupatra, Nikarchidas, and Aristoklea sold to Apollo Pythios a female slave, whose 
name is Sosipatra, Syrian by birth, for a price of three minas of silver, and they have the full price, according as Sosipatra 
entrusted the purchase to the god, on condition that she be free and untouchable by all for all her life, doing whatever she 
wishes and departing whereever she wishes. … 
Many sales stipulated the universal right to rescue any freedperson to whom someone laid wrongful 
claim (FD III.2 126): 
   ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἀπέδοτο Ξένων 
 Σωσιξένου, συνευδοκεούσας καὶ τᾶς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ Καλλοῦς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ Σωσιξένου, τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι 
τῶι Πυθίωι 
4 σῶμα γυναικεῖον ἇι ὅνομα Ἀπολλωνία, καὶ παιδάριον ὧι ὄνομα Φίλων, τὸ γένος ἐνδογενεῖς, τιμᾶς 
ἀργυρίου 
 μνᾶν πέντε, καὶ τὰν τιμὰν ἔχει πᾶσαν. βεβαιωτὴρ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τᾶς πόλιος· Νικίας Βαβύτρα, ἐφ’ 
ὧιτε 
 ἐλευθέρους εἶμεν Ἀπολλωνίαν καὶ Φίλωνα καὶ ἀνεφάπτους ἀπὸ πάντων, ποιοῦντας ὅ κα θέλωντι 
 καὶ ἀποτρέχοντας οἷς κα θέλωντι. εἰ  δέ  τις  ἐφάπτοιτο  Ἀπολλωνίας  ἢ  Φίλωνος  ἐπὶ  
καταδουλισμ[ῶι]  
8 κύριος  ἔστω  ὁ  παρατυχὼν  συλέων  ὡς  ἐλευθέρους  ὄντας ,  ἀζάμιος  ἐὼν  καὶ  ἀνυπόδικος  
πάσας  δίκας  κα[ ὶ]  
 ζαμίας . 
 
… [5] Warrantor in accordance with the laws of the city: Nikias son of Babutras. (Sold) on condition that Apollonia and 
Philon be free and untouchable by all, doing whatever they wish and departing wherever they wish. If anyone should lay 
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hands on Apollonia or Philon with a view to enslavement, then he who happens to rescue them on grounds that they are 
free shall have authority (to do so), being immune to penalty and unliable to any action and penalty. 
Some also declared the obligation of the seller and warrantor to furnish the wrongful claimant with a 
clean title (e.g. FD III.2 130). 
   βεβα[ιωτήρ· Βα]β[ύλος Ἀνδρομένε]ος, κα- 
8 θὼς ἐπίστευσε Εἰράνα τῷ θεῷ τὰν ὠνάν, ἐφ’ ᾧτε ἐλε[υθέρα εἶμ[εν καὶ ἀνέφαπτο]ς ἀπὸ πάν- 
 των τὸν πάντα βίον, ποιοῦσα ὅ κα θέλῃ, καὶ ἀποτρέχου[σα]{ν} ᾅ κα θέληῳ. ε[ἰ δέ τις] ἐφάπτοιτο ἐπὶ 
 καταδουλισμῷ Εἰράνας, βέβαιον  παρεχόντω  τὰν  ὠ[νὰ]ν  τῷ  θεῷ  ἅ  τε  ἀποδομένα  Δαμὼ  καὶ  
 ὁ  βεβαιωτὴρ  Βαβύλος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ παρατυχὼν [κ]ύριος ἔστω συλέων Εἰράναν ὡς ἐλευ- 
12 θέραν οὖσαν, ἀζάμιος ὢν καὶ ἀνυπόδικος πάσας δ[ίκ]ας καὶ ζαμίας. 
 
… [9] If anyone should lay hands on Eirana with a view to enslavement then both the seller, Damo, and the warrantor, 
Babylos, shall warrant the purchase (lit. furnish the purchase as secure) for the god … 
A number of observations can be made. Though we call these texts ‘manumission inscriptions’ or 
‘fictive sales,’ they present themselves as records of sale.13 After the dating formula, they almost always 
begin with “ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἀπέδοτο” or simply “ἀπέδοτο.” Statement of price and acknowledgement of 
receipt of payment are standard.14 Sellers and warrantors are to warrant the god’s purchase.15 The 
blanket extension of legal immunity to anyone who happens to rescue a freedperson to whom someone 
laid unlawful claim was not trivial. With no identity card to protect her, a freedperson under duress had 
to rely on the help of others, who might not risk it. The Delphic sales made it easier to assist. This was a 
powerful protection. It is noteworthy that sellers and warrantors are not obliged to attest to the 
manumission or legal state of the person who had been sold. This would be curious if ancient actors 
thought of these as ‘manumission inscriptions.’ But that oddity vanishes if witnessing the sale did not 
necessarily mean witnessing the manumission, that is, if manumission followed, as a distinct act. This, I 
suggest, is what happened. 
 In these texts, freedom is framed as a stipulation of sale but manumission is not said to be an 
automatic or immediate result of the transaction’s initiation. Scholars often interpret the phrase ἐφ’ ᾧτε 
ἐλευθέραν εἶμεν as effecting liberty upon initiation of the sale or else as indicating that liberty exists 
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already.16 But this misconstrues the Greek; ἐπὶ plus the dative often voiced a required future action, 
stipulated a condition or provision. We are certain of that use here, since a great many of the sales 
followed precisely the same form, but used ὥστε with the same provisional sense.17 On this point of 
syntax, and in their general form, the Delphic sales followed a well attested pattern. Compare a fourth-
century lease, which begins with a dating formula, then indicates that several individuals “let according 
to the following conditions” (κατὰ τάδε ἐµίσθωσαν) several structures for 54 drachmas per year, “on 
condition that (the lessee) pay” (ἐφ’ ὧιτε διδόν|αι) the rent in two instalments.18 The basic structure was 
the same:  
 
 IG II2 2496 SGDI II 1825  
 κατὰ τάδε ἐμίσθωσαν  ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἀπέδοτο 
 lessors / e.g. τὸ ἐργαστήριον / lessee seller / purchaser / e.g. σῶμα γυναικεῖον 
 δραχμῶν N τιμᾶς ἀργυρίου μνᾶν N 
 ἐφ’ ὧιτε διδόναι ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέραν εἶμεν 
 
The infinitive ‘to be’ in the Delphic sales no more declared a contemporary fact or action than διδόναι 
did. It referred to a status to be achieved as one stipulation of the contract, something that “is to” come 
about. This prospective, future, sense of the infinitive is found in innumerable legal instruments; polities 
decreed that X is to be the case, and so on. This is the backbone of Greek legal utterance, the syntax with 
which words made facts. The lessee rented land on condition that he then pay. The god purchased a 
slave on condition that s/he then be free. These texts named freedom as a pre-condition to full execution 
of the contract, but the words words ἐφ’ ᾧτε ἐλευθέραν εἶµεν did not themselves manumit anyone. 
 Manumission was a witnessed formal pronouncement, sometimes private, often public.19 
Required words may have been few.20 At Delphi, freedom was framed as a condition of sale, with the 
result that no transaction could be final until a legal person freed the slave. That person could only be the 
new owner, and that was Apollo. Thus, when someone sold Apollo a slave on condition of freedom, the 
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expectation and requirement, I urge, was that the god’s agent would then speak the words, formally 
effecting the manumission and thereby completing the terms of the contract. Money changed hands, the 
god took possession, and then he freed the slave. The last probably took no more than a few seconds. It 
was not inscribed and did not need to be. The sale enumerated the terms of the slave’s path to freedom; 
the sale estopped claims against a freedperson’s liberty; anyone who wanted to contest such a 
freedman’s liberty would have to face the purchaser, the god; the sale was the thing to record. 
 Whatever other stipulations were attached to the sales, the requirement to remain, paramone, 
could be added, as in, e.g., FD III.1 303: 
 ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἀπέδοτο Μνασίμαχος Ἀν- 
 τιμάχου Φυσκεὺς τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Πυθίῳ σῶμα ἀνδρεῖον παιδάριον, ᾧ ὄνομα Ἀγαθο- 
4 κλῆς, γένει Φυσκικὸν, τιμᾶς ἀργυρίου [μ]νᾶν πέντε, καὶ τὰν τιμὰν ἀπέχει πᾶσαν, καθὼς ἐ- 
 πίστευσε τῷ θεῷ τὰν ὠνὰν Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἐφ’ ᾧτε ἐλεύθερος εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτος 
 ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν πάντα χρόνον. παραμινάτω δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς Μνασιμάχῳ πάντα τὸν 
 τᾶς ζωᾶς αὐτοῦ χρόνον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιέοι, ἐξουσίαν ἐχέτω Μνασίμαχος ἐπιτιμέων Ἀ- 
8 γαθοκλεῖ τρόπὼ ᾧ κα θέλῃ, καὶ ἄλλος ὑπὲρ Μνασίμαχον ὅν κα κελεύσῃ. ἐπεὶ δὲ κά τι 
 πάθῃ ἀνθρώπινον Μνασίμαχος, ποιησάτω τὰ ποτὶ τὰν ταφὰν πάντα, καθὼς ἔθος ἐσ- 
 τίν, Ἀγαθοκλῆς, καὶ ἔστω ἐλεύθερος, μηδενὶ μηδὲν ποθήκων κατὰ μηδένα τρ[όπο]ν. 
 
On the following terms Mnasimachos son of Antimachos, of Physkos, sold to Apollo Pythios a male slave boy, whose 
name is Agathokles, Physkian by birth, for a price of five minas of silver, and he has the full price according, as 
Agathokles entrusted the purchase to the god on condition that he be free and untouchable by all for all time. But 
Agathokles shall remain by Mnasimachos for the entire duration of his (Mnasimachos’) life. If he should not do so, then 
Mnasimachos shall have power to punish Agathokles in whatever manner he wishes, and so shall another person on 
Mnasimachos’ behalf, whomever he bids. But whenever Mnasimachos dies, Agathokles shall perform everything for the 
burial, as is the custom, and he shall be free, belonging to no one at all in any way. 
Now, on the consensus interpretation, Mnasimachos sold Agathokles, on the condition that he (sc. 
thereby and immediately) became free; but that he was then to serve Mnasimachos (sc. in a state of 
semi-freedom); and that upon Mnasimachos’ death (sc. the semi-free) Agathokles was to become (sc. 
really) free. But if the formula ἐφ’ ᾧτε ἐλεύθερος εἶμεν indicates sale on condition of subsequent 
freedom,21 as Greek suggests, then we need not resort to such heavy interpolation, just to render a kind 
of sense that most agree is paradoxical. On a much simpler reading, Agathokles was sold on condition of 
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later manumission, but he was required first, as a slave, to ‘remain’ with and obey his former owner, 
upon whose death, and not before, he was to become free. The sale contract did not itself enact 
manumission, but defined, as a condition of execution, the future event that would trigger it. Moreover, 
as we saw above, the freed slaves’ autonomy of movement and action was stipulated even in cases of 
sale without paramone, which tells us that this protection applied not to those who served under 
paramone but to those who had already completed their servitude and were now free. Thus, some sales 
clarify that the protection is to apply “after [the original owner] has died”22 or “if anyone lays hands on 
[him] with a view to enslavement, after the time has elapsed,”23 that is, as other sales put it, “after 
paramone,” or “whenever [the former owner] dies.”24 Protection prior to that was explicitly 
extraordinary: one sale requires seller and warrantors to warrant the purchase “if anyone lays hands on 
Epimeles with a view to enslavement, after Ageson has died, or even before” (ἢ καὶ πρότερον).25 
Protection offered ‘even before’ manumission was a rare kindness.  
 Several dozen Delphic sales stipulate that failure to perform paramone will render the purchase 
invalid and unaccomplished.26 If manumission is a condition of sale and paramone a condition of 
manumission, then no sale was complete until paramone was; failure to ‘remain’ meant that the sale was 
unaccomplished and the slave simply abided in his current physical and legal position, a slave, under 
ownership and control of his original owner. A sale from Naupaktos spells this out very clearly. Mikkion 
sold his slave Philoxenos to Asklepios. The record of sale indicates that “Philoxenos shall remain with 
Mikkion, so long as Mikkion lives, doing what is ordered. But if he does not so do, then the purchase 
shall be unaccomplished (ἀτελὴς). But if Mikkion dies, then at that time the purchase shall be binding 
(κυρία).”27 There was to be no binding sale, and so no manumission, until the former owner’s death, 
which opened the door to manumission and, thus, full execution of the contract. The Delphic sales do 
not stipulate that failure to remain was to invalidate the manumission, for manumission was the final 
action to be performed as a condition of sale. So long as the former owner lived, there was no 
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manumission to invalidate. It does not appear to have been noted that grammar bears this out. The vast 
majority of Delphic sales that stipulated paramone signaled so with an aorist imperative 
(παραμ(ε)ινάτω, -άτωσαν);28 this demanded full and prior completion of one act, before progress to 
the next.29 First, let a slave serve and be done with it (παραμεινάτω); then, let her commence being 
free (ἔστω).30 
 Consensus confounds the procedural order of these transactions, which were simpler than we 
have thought: slaves were sold to a new owner, Apollo, whom they left under a requirement to ‘remain’ 
in prescribed service, as slaves, to their former owners, under threat of corporal punishment, to which all 
slaves were liable, and on the revocable condition that they be free upon completion of service to their 
former master, usually upon his or her death. Confusion is understandable, for the formulaic clauses in 
these documents are not always presented in the same order. Sometimes the texts treat the rights to 
warrant the sale and to rescue a freedman from re-enslavement before they stipulate paramone. Even if 
this order is inconsequential,31 “The protection clauses seem to present a paradox: while still obligated to 
their manumittors, the manumitted slaves were legally, but not practically, free and could not use the 
means of protection inserted in their manumission document.”32 See e.g. FD III.3 45: 
 ἀ̣[πέδοτο Εὐφροσύνα – – – ] 
 [..]κλέος Θηβαία, συνευαρεστεούσ[ας καὶ τᾶς θυγατέρος(?)] 
4 [αὐ]τᾶς Εὐνοίας, τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Πυθίω[ι] 
 τὰν ἰδίαν θρεπτὰν Ἀφροδεισίαν δωρεάν, ἐφ’ ὧ[ιτε ἐλευ]- 
 θέραν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτον ἀπὸ [πά]ντω[ν]. εἰ δέ τις ἐ[φάπ]- 
 [τ]οιτο Ἀφροδεισίας ἐπὶ καταδουλισμῶ, ὁ βεβαιωτὴρ βέ[βαι]- 
8 ον Μέντωρ Λαιάδα παρεχέτω τῶ θεῶ τὰν ὠνάν, κύριος δὲ ἔστω καὶ ὁ π[α]- 
 ρατυχὼν συλέων ὑπὲρ τὸν θεὸν ἐλευθέραν οὖσαν [Ἀ]- 
 φροδεισίαν ἀζάμιος ὢν καὶ ἀνυπόδικος [πάσ]ας δίκα[ς] 
 κα[ὶ] ζαμίας. παραμεινάτω δὲ Ἀφροδεισία Εὐ[φρο]σύναι [ἕως] 
12 [κ]α [ζ]ῆ ποιοῦσα τὸ ἐπιτασόμενον πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν. [εἰ] 
 δὲ μὴ παραμένοι ἢ μὴ ποέοι τὸ ἐπιτασόμενον, κυ[ρία] 
 ἔστω Εὐφροσύνα ἐπιτιμέουσα Ἀφροδεισία τρόπ[ω] 
 ὧ κα θέλη πλὰν μὴ πωλέουσαν. μὴ ἐχέτω δὲ [ἐξ]- 
16 [ουσί]αν ἀπελθεῖν ἀπὸ Εὐφροσύνας ἕως κα ζ[ῆ. εἰ δέ] 
 [κά] τ[ι] πάθοι Εὐφροσύνα. ἐλευθέρα ἔ[στω] 
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 Ἀ[φρ]οδεισία.  
 
Euphrosyne daughter of -kles, Theban, with approval also of her daughter(?) Eunoia, sold to Apollo Pythios her own 
slave Aphrodeisia, at no cost, on condition that she be free and untouchable by all. If anyone should lay hands on 
Aphrodeisia with a view to enslaving (her), the warrantor, Mentor son of Laias, shall warrant the purchase by the god, 
and he who happens to rescue Aphrodeisia, on behalf of the god, on grounds that she is free shall have authority (to do 
so), being immune to penalty and unliable to any action and penalty. But Aphrodeisia shall remain with Euphrosyna so 
long as she (Euphrosyna) lives, doing every possible thing that is ordered; but if she should not remain or do what is 
ordered then Euphrosyna shall have authority to punish Aphrodeisia in whatever manner she wishes, except for selling 
her. She shall not have the power to leave Euphrosyna so long as she lives. But if Euphrosyna should die, Aphrodeisia 
shall be free. 
But no text tells that freedom preceded paramone, and if those who remained were slaves and the 
protection clauses applied to them only after manumission, then the ‘paradox’ disappears. If the person 
subject to paramone was free then it would have been superfluous to stipulate that the former owner 
could not punish her with re-sale. A very small number of sales at Delphi permitted not only battery and 
shackling but even sale as punishment for disobedient remainers.33 Much more often, they allowed, as 
Aphrodeisia’s did, any punishment except for sale.34 Either way, the contracts could countenance 
punitive re-sale—whether to bar or in rare cases permit it—first, because the individuals who ‘remained’ 
in service were slaves and slaves were sellable, and, second, because all parties recognized the reality of 
the god’s legal standing as owner; one did not sell property to which the god held title without special 
permission. The slaves who were sold on condition of paramone did not ‘remain’ after manumission, 
but were promised manumission on condition that they ‘remain’ first. As the text above and so many 
others clearly state, the death of a former master triggered conversion to freedom: εἰ δέ | κά] τ[ι] πάθοι 
Εὐφροσύνα, ἐλευθέρα ἔ[στω] | Ἀ[φρ]οδεισία. Aphrodeisia was to be enslaved until the demise of 
her former owner and to be free thereafter. Some texts make the point very clearly, indicating that the 
slave “entrusted the purchase to the god, on condition that [he] be free whenever (his master) Alexon 
dies. But [he] shall remain with Alexon, doing all that is ordered.”35 We can scarcely ask for a clearer 
expression of the order of things: first sale, then paramone, and finally manumission. 
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 Nevertheless, it is suggested that although the slaves who were sold at Delphi on condition of 
paramone “did this work as ‘free people,’”36 
they were presumably not paid and their labor was still conceptualized as servile. This conception is best exemplified by 
Hellenistic manumission inscriptions, where we find phrases like “let [these freed slaves] remain in paramonê service … 
doing servile labor [doul(eu)ontes] and doing everything ordered blamelessly” and “let her remain in paramonê … doing 
everything ordered like a slave [hôs doula].” 
The first quotation translates FD III.3 294.8–10, which states that “the aforementioned slaves … are to 
remain …, slaving:” παραμεινά[τ]ωσαν  δὲ̣̣ Στρατάγωι τὰ προγεγραμμένα [σώματα] 
Ζωπ[ύρα, Πυκινά, Παρ]|θένα, Διονυσία, Νικίας, Σωκράτης πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἕως κ[α ζῇ 
Στράταγ]ος δουλ ̣[εύ]|οντες  καὶ ποιοῦντες πᾶν τὸ ἐπιτασσόμενον ἀνεγκλήτως.37 The 
second is FD III.3 329.4–5, and requires that “Eisias is to remain … doing all that is ordered, as a 
slave”: παραμεινάτω  δὲ Εἰσιὰς  [Κλε]ομάν[τει πάν|τα τὸν τᾶς ζ]ωᾶς [χρ]όνον πᾶν 
ποιοῦσα  τὸ  ἐπιτασσόμενον  πᾶν  ὡς  δούλα . The phrase “ποιοῦσα … ὡς δούλα” 
(‘performing as a slave’) is simply cognate with “δουλ̣[εύ]|οντες καὶ ποιοῦντες” (‘slaving and 
performing’).38 Whatever promise of future manumission was written into the sale, for the slave, 
paramone meant “slaving nevertheless” (δουλεύ|ων καθὼς καὶ ὥς).39 The Greek speaks plainly of 
slave labor, and not slave-like labor performed by slave-like freedpersons.40 A number of sales frame 
this fact quite clearly by declaring the obligation first to remain with the aorist participle (e.g. SGDI II 
1715.4–5): ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέρους εἶμεν καὶ | ἀνε[φά]πτους ἀπὸ πάν[των τὸμ πάν]τα βίον, 
παραμείναντας ἄχρι κα ζώη Ἀγαμήστωρ.41 The slaves were sold on condition that they be free 
“after they have remained.” In his will Nikon disposed, “that, if Nikon lives an additional eight years or 
more, then, if Nikon dies, Dorema shall be free after she has remained (παραμείνασαν).”42 Paramone 
meant remaining in service, not despite one’s new freedom, but despite one’s new owner. 
 Numerous other features of these sales confirm this same pattern, under which slaves owed 
paramone to their former masters and were only manumitted after performance of such. Among the 
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several dozen releases from paramone that are preserved in the Delphic corpus slaves sometimes paid 
money for early release, sometimes did not,43 but, either way, they were often released from paramone 
“on condition that they be free.”44 Theophilos sold Niko “on condition that she be free” and under a 
requirement to remain;45 he later released her from paramone “on condition that she be free.”46 On the 
consensus view, then, we have two legal instruments that deploy the same formula to indicate two 
incompatible constructions of freedom. This would be a bizarre convention. In at least one case, though, 
early release and release upon death of the former master were explicitly said to generate identical legal 
states.47 In both sale and release the construction simply indicated that freedom was to follow paramone. 
Thus, handful of early releases from paramone specify that “from this time forward, [the person] shall 
be free.”48 One sale uses the same expression to describe a slave’s transition to freedom after its master’s 
death, that is, after performance of paramone, not after initial conveyance.49 Sales that supersede prior 
sales are also consistent with paramone that was conducted in servitude. Telon and Kleto sold Sosos on 
condition that he be free; “but the previously existing purchase of Sosos by Apollo … and the things 
stipulated in the purchase, namely that Sosos remain by Telon and Kleto so long as they live, shall be 
unaccomplished and withdrawn.”50 Here, and elsewhere,51 the seller did not release the slave from 
paramone, but nullified the original contract and replaced it with a superseding sale that did not require 
paramone. This was possible because the prior sale had not yet been fully executed and the individual in 
service remained a slave. 
 Sales that dictate procedure to be followed in the event that remainers should bear children show 
the same pattern. Some such children were to be free on the same conditions as their mothers. If Sostrata 
bore children while she was remaining, they too were to be free “after having remained,” unless 
Sostrata’s former owners wished to sell “owing to need.”52 If Sostrata’s offspring were sellable they 
were slaves, and if they were slaves, then their mother was too. Some children are to be “free and 
untouchable according as also [their mothers]” are,53 or free “as has been written above,”54 i.e. 
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concerning the mother. In other words, both mother and child were to be free after service. One record 
of sale required a remainer to produce and remand one or two children and barred her from rearing any 
offspring of her own.55 Often a woman performing paramone was required to provide a baby to the 
former owner whom she served.56 Such deprivation is the slave’s lot. Kleomantis sold Eisias on 
condition of freedom; she was to remain for the duration of his life, “doing” as we saw above, “all that is 
ordered, as a slave,” and then to be free (FD III.3 329). But Kleomantis later released from paramone 
Eisias and “the son who had been born to her in paramone, Nikostratos, whom [he] also renamed 
‘Kleomantis’ upon adoption, so that they may be free.”57 If they were released from paramone so that 
they might be free, then Nikomachos was not born free. A child born under its mother’s paramone was, 
like its mother, a slave. A child’s servitude might have been limited by the term of its mother’s, but was 
the default reality at birth. 
 Now, in several cases it is specified without additional qualification that children born in their 
mother’s time of paramone are to be free and belong to no one.58 This has suggested to some that such 
children—and, in fact, all children born to mothers who were performing paramone—were born free.59 
But the sellability of children so born tells otherwise. So, why simply declare them free? If the mothers 
were slaves then the presumption informing all sales that addressed the freedom of children born in 
service will have been (a) that such children were born slaves, and probably (b) that where their own 
freedom was stipulated in their mothers’ sales it was to be awarded under the same conditions, unless 
otherwise specified. To call them free, I urge, was to call them, implicitly, free on the same conditions 
that applied to their mothers. These texts often take similarly important facts for granted: any child born 
to Theoxena while she was serving was to be free, but the record of her sale does not state that she 
herself was to be free upon completion of service!60 The record of Sosikrates’ sale does not specify, ‘on 
condition that he be free.’61 For a transaction that was conducted with such frequency and within such 
well known parameters, omissions of this sort were unproblematic. Thus, it was sometimes said that 
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children born in service were to be free on the same conditions that applied to their mothers, but it did 
not need to be.62 The only thing that had to be stated was that they were to be free at all (if such was the 
intent), for they were born slaves and, barring stipulation to the contrary, would remain so.63 Mothers 
performing paramone were slaves and their children born in that period were too.  
 Several joint manumissions are similarly elliptical and consistent with paramone performed in 
servitude. Aristodamos sold Gorgo and her son Nikoboulos on condition that the boy remain two years 
and then be free. The record of sale does not speak of Gorgo’s freedom at all. She was to be freed 
promptly after sale and her son “once [he] has remained for the specified time”—again, the aorist.64 
Nikomachos and Neiko sold Zopyra and her three children on condition of freedom, stipulating that the 
children remain in service to the sellers’ son Dionysios for as long as he lived.65 The record of sale does 
not stipulate that any of them “shall be free” (ἔστω, ἔστωσαν); all were sold “on condition of 
freedom” (ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ) and “on condition that they be free” (ἐφ’ ᾧτε ἐλεύθεροι εἶμεν), phrases that 
did not by themselves produce liberty. Eunomia sold Isargyron and her son Lykiskos with the stipulation 
that the mother remain for the duration of Eunomia’s life; Lykiskos on the other hand “shall not remain, 
but shall be free” (μὴ πα[ραμεινάτω Ε]ὐνομίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ἔστω ἐλεύθ[ερος).66 The sale is not said to 
have been made ‘on condition of freedom’ and neither does the record state that Isargyron ‘shall be 
free;’ so much could be assumed. But the text does explicitly frame ‘not remaining’ and ‘being free’ as a 
pair,67 inviting the inference that ‘remain’ and ‘being unfree’ were as well.  
 Even after manumission, slaves could be subject to various intrusions. In one striking example 
Epicharidas of Lilaia sold a slave named Asia “on condition that she be free, provided that she live in 
Lilaia, and that she be untouchable for her whole life, doing whatever she wishes.”68 Asia was to be 
manumitted directly after sale. The record does not stipulate paramone. If anyone lays hand on her she 
is to enjoy the usual protections.69 But strings were attached: “Asia shall not reside outside Lilaia nor 
take up citizenship without Epicharidas’ approval. If she does (so) reside or take up citizenship, then her 
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purchase shall be invalid and unaccomplished. And likewise Asia shall not alienate (anything) if she gets 
any additional work from Epicharidas or his heirs, in any manner. And if she should alienate (anything) 
in any manner, her purchase shall be invalid, according as also written above. Whenever Asia dies all of 
her property shall belong to Epicharidas or his heirs.”70 Histio was required to remain by her former 
owner Philon so long as he lived; she was to be free upon his death but “shall be unable to settle 
anywhere other than in Delphi. And she shall crown the image of Philon, monthly on the first and 
seventh, with a crown of plaited laurel.”71 Timo sold a young slave named Meda without paramone but 
on condition that, upon maturity, she maintain her biological parents—presumably Timo’s slaves at the 
time of their daughter’s sale—“whether they should be slaves or have become free.”72 These three 
women—perhaps Asia most of all—were freed into a life with constraints.73 But such invasive terms 
were stipulations of particular manumissions, not generic requirements imposed on all, and generally not 
the norm. In mosts cases, onerous requirements were imposed on slaves while they remained and not on 
freedmen. Manumittors could require what they would. As we shall see, Neaira was freed on condition 
that she not work in Corinth, a constraint that in no way diminished her legal freedom.74 Asia, Histio, 
and Meda were to enjoy freedom that might have been less than ideal (from their point of view) but it 
was not less than full; if the only barrier to Asia’s seeking citizenship was Epicharidas’ approval, then 
she cannot have been anything less than legally free. Whether one was born free or made so, legal 
freedom did not mean absolute freedom. It never has. 
 Slaves who remained were likewise required to do as ordered, and the consequences of 
disobedience could be severe: sales generally gave wide latitude to former owners in the meting out of 
punishment. A few, however, stipulated that the former owner’s charges were to be adjudicated by 
binding arbitration. For example, Sosias sold Nikaia and her son Isthmos, who were to remain by Sosias, 
doing all that they were asked. “But if Nikaia and Isthmos should not do so, then the purchase shall not 
be guaranteed for them, but shall be invalid. And if Sosias should accuse Nikaia or Isthmos of anything, 
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they shall be adjudicated by three men. Whatever these men rule shall be binding.”75 This fact is 
sometimes adduced to show that those who remained must have been free.76 But such adjudication was 
the exception; in hundreds of cases former owners were permitted to punish disobedient remainers 
“however they wish,”77 which sometimes included, explicitly, whipping and binding.78 If the five slaves 
whom Sotima and Polytimidas sold did not do as ordered “Sotima and Polytimidas are to have the 
authority to punish them as slaves” (ἐπιτιμέοντες ὡς δούλοις).79 To punish a person “however one 
wishes” and “as a slave” are two expressions of the same power. Moreover, some sales stipulated that 
failure to remain or perform as ordered would invalidate the purchase,80 which can only have meant that 
the slave would return to the former owner, no less a slave, and with the promise of future manumission 
annulled. It is easy to credit that a small number of owners were willing to submit grievances against 
slaves, who had been promised eventual manumission, to binding arbitration. Punitive re-sale was often 
barred; one sale allowed punishment with “harmless blows” (πλαγαῖς ἀσινέοις).81 A few slaves were 
sold “for free” (δωρεάν).82 Thus, we do see glimpses of moderation, and this must be the explanation 
for the very rare stipulation that a former owner was permitted to punish a remaining slave “in whatever 
manner she wishes, as a free woman” (ὡς ἐλευθέρα).83 Dareste, Haussoulier and Reinach took this as 
clear indication that all who performed paramone were free,84 but this very rare qualification stands in 
bleak contrast to the hundreds of sales that granted the former owner nearly unlimited exercise of force. 
To punish a slave as a free woman was an uncommon kindness, like “harmless blows” or submitting a 
dispute with a slave to arbitration; these were exceptional gestures of humanity, and credible as such. 
The consensus interpretation, by contrast, posits a juridical paradox under which hundreds of sales 
submitted freed men and women to the kind of unchecked, discretionary, physical violation and 
deprivation that is a hallmark of slavery, and generally unavailable for use against the free. The paradox 
vanishes if at Delphi paramone was a condition to which slaves were liable and which manumission 
never preceded but only followed. 
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 The consensus view of the Delphic mechanism posits (1) that the sale was executed at once and 
the slave freed thereby, which is not what the Greek says; (2) that, in an apparent “paradox,” paramone 
reduced the freedom just conferred to a conditional half-state, rather than simply preceding it, which is 
what the syntax and numerous passages show; (3) that upon the former master’s death the half-free 
freedman is thenceforth to be really free; (4) that lawful and binding contracts used the same word, 
eleutheros, to mean both ‘free but not really free’ and ‘fully and legally free,’ and did not disambiguate 
the two; (5) that all of this was enshrined in a transaction that looks in every way like a proper sale, but 
which we know to have been fictive. To reveal the profound scope of interpolation that this entails, let 
us imagine that my son has been asking for a tablet computer. My wife and I tell him, “We’ve bought a 
tablet, on condition that you use it for reading. But first you must be well behaved till your birthday. 
Then, you may use it for reading.” He knows that we have purchased the tablet; that he must be well-
behaved between now and his birthday; that he will then get the tablet, to use for reading. To interpret 
this the way the Delphic sales have been understood we must assume (1) that we meant “We’ve bought 
and have now given you a tablet;” (2) that we did not mean to specify “first;” (3) that between now and 
his birthday he may half-use the tablet but that upon his next birthday he may really use it; (4) that the 
same phrase “use it for reading” denotes both half-use and full use; and (5) that while I am calling this a 
gift, it is really a loan! Like this: “We’ve bought <and have now ‘given’ you> a tablet, <for the purpose 
of using it now> for reading. But {first} you must be well behaved till your birthday (sc. while you are 
sort-of using it). Then, you may <really> use it for reading.” But such heavy intervention is 
unnecessary, for a more straightforward, literal, interpretation is available.  
 The Delphic “manumission inscriptions” are records of sale. Sale was the vehicle for 
manumission, but that does not make it a fiction. The god bought the slaves; punitive re-sale of his 
human property was generally forbidden, and in the event that someone tried to haul one of his freedman 
into slavery the seller and warrantor were to warrant the purchase, that is, ownership by the god. The 
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safeguards presume agreement by all parties that the god was the lawful purchaser. The contracts 
specified the terms of sale, including manumission, whether enacted promptly, where there was to be no 
paramone, or triggered by future event, where there was. Paramone was carried out in a state of full and 
unambiguous legal servitude. The transactions did not create individuals who were half-free, both free 
and slave, or any other juridical chimera. The god’s slaves were compelled under threat of brutality, as 
slaves were, to perform certain service, upon completion of whose term they were to be made so free 
that anyone was to have authority to rescue them without fear of legal action or penalty. That was as 
complete a protection of freedom as Greek legal thinking knew how to construct. At Delphi—at least 
insofar as these sales tell us—a person was either free or slave. 
 
Practice Elsewhere 
Consensus holds that other Greek polities were also juridically cognizant of a category of persons who 
were legally free, under no judicial or military sanction, and yet remanded to a slave-like state in which 
their movements were controlled, their bodies subject to violent invasion, and their freedom at risk of 
liquidation on the open market. But the binary construction of legal status that we see at Delphi appears 
to have been the norm elsewhere as well. 
 Boiotian epigraphy has preserved well over 100 dedications of slaves, which appear also to have 
been made on condition of manumission.85 Alienation to the god was achieved through dedication rather 
than sale, but with the same end in view: freedom. The Boiotian dedications do not mention freedom as 
a condition and, like the Delphic sales, do not speak explicitly of manumission. But the widespread and 
reasonable scholarly assumption is that the dedication somehow entailed conversion to freedom. This 
was no contradiction. Some twenty or so Delphic sales indicate that when the former owner has died the 
slave is to become at once “the god’s” and “free,” which can only mean that the slave was the god’s 
concern if not his property.86 At Bouthrotos freedmen were said to be “freed and dedicated as sacred” to 
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the god.87 At Naupaktos, when his former master died, Philetairos, who had been sold to Athena, was 
“to be sacred, untouchable, and free.”88 To be dedicated was to be the god’s, was to be sacred, was, in 
this context, to be legally free and under a deity’s protection.89 Many dedications stipulated paramone 
(e.g. IG VII 3314): 
 Ἀρχεδάμω ἀρχῶ, μεινὸς Ὁμολωΐω πεντεκαιδεκάτη, Μηλὶς 
 Φιλήμονος ἀνατίθητι τὼς ϝιδίως δούλως Σώτιμον κὴ Σωτη[ρί]- 
 χαν ἱαρὼς τεῖ Σεράπι παραμείναντας αὐτῆ [ἀ]νεγκλείτως ἇς κ[α] 
 ζώει, τὰν ἀνάθεσιν ποιουμένα διὰ τῶ συνεδ[ρίω] κατὰ τὸν νόμον.  
Zelnick-Abramovitz translates (90): 
Melis daughter of Philemon consecrates her personal slaves Sotimon and Sotericha as sacred to Serapis, on condition 
that they remain with her as long as she lives, giving no reason for reproach, and she makes the consecration through the 
Council, according to the law. 
This ignores the aorist participle, which we have seen already in the same use at Delphi, and which tells 
that Melis dedicates her slaves, “after they have remained” (παραμείναντας). In other words, the 
dedication is declared in the timeless present tense but is not to take effect until the slaves have 
completed their service.90 Sotimon and Sotericha, then, will not be the god’s, will not be free, until they 
have performed the required service. The Boiotian dedications that specify paramone always use the 
aorist participle, never the present. Here, as with Delphic sales, the regular order was first service as a 
slave and then freedom. 
 Inscribed records of manumission show the same sequence. A Phokian text declares that 
“Soteridas son of Xenon, a Delphian, releases as free Xenon and Paramonon, his own housebred slaves, 
after they have remained (παραμείναντας) with Soteridas for the full duration of his life, and he 
dedicates them to the god Asklepios in Stira.”91 Here too, dedication was not incompatible with liberty, 
but the very safeguard of it. Such manumissions were effected “after service” at Mantinea, and in large 
numbers at Bouthrotos and Kalymna.92 A stele from the Kabeirion at Lemnian Hephaistia records 
numerous manumissions, two dozen of which stipulate paramone, all with the same formulaic order and 
syntax (e.g.): “Damas son of Demetrios, of Halimous, sets his own bred slave Eumenes free, after he has 
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remained (παραμείναν|τα) by him so long as he lives, to depart (ἀπιέναι) from the land wherever he 
wishes, belonging to no one at all.”93 Liberty, in these Lemnian manumissions is framed as freedom “to 
depart,” in independence (μηθενὶ μηθὲν προσήκοντα); where these texts require paramone the aorist 
participle always splits the direct object from the epexegetic infinitive, underscoring that a slave is to be 
‘free—pending service—to leave.’ A detailed record of manumission from Thespiai stipulates the place 
and circumstance in which the formal speech act of manumission was to take place (I.Thespiai 214): 
 Εὔτυχος Καλλικράτεος 
4 [ἀφί]ε<ι>τι ἐλευθέρως Ἁγίαν, Ὀνά[σι]- 
 μον, Ἁ[γ]είσιππον, Σέλευκον, Εὑρ[έ]- 
 αν, [Β]ουκατίαν, Σύραν· εἶμεν δὲ α̣[ὐ]- 
 τοῖς πανελευθερίαν παρα[μει]- 
8 νάντεσι εὐνόως ἀνε<ν>κλείτο[ις] 
 γενομένοις Εὐτύχοι ἅω̣ς [κ]α ζ̣[ώει]· 
 ἐπὶ δέ τί κα πάθει Εὔτυχος, παρακ[ατ]- 
 [α]τίθεται οὗτα τὰ σώμα[τα] 
12 ἐναντία τῶ Ἀσκλαπιῶ παρὰ 
 [Ἐ]πίτιμον Σαμίχω κὴ Σάμιχον 
 [κ]ὴ Καλλικράτης Ἐπιτίμ[ω]· οὕτ[ως] 
 [δ]ὲ προστατεῖμεν αὐτῶν κὴ [ἐπι]- 
16 μέλεσθαι [ὅ]πως βέβαια εἴη αὐτ̣[ο]- 
 ῖς ἁ ἐλευθερία καθὰ Εὔτυχος ἀπ- 
 [έ]θει, ἐν τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον· ἐπὶ 
 δέ κα τελευτάσει Εὔτυχος ἀπ[ο]- 
20 καρυξάτω ἐπὶ τῶ μνάματος 
 Ἐπίτιμος κὴ Σάμιχος κὴ Καλλι- 
 κράτης ἐλεύθερα [οὗτ]α τὰ σώ- 
 [μ]ατα ἀφιέντα Εὔτυχον κὰτ [τ]- 
24 ὰν στάλαν τὰν ἐν Ἀσκλαπ[ιεί]- 
 οι. 
 
Eutychos son of Kallikrates releases as free Agias, Onasimos, Ageisippos, Seleukos, Eureas, Boukatia, Syra. (that) there 
shall be for them total freedom, after they have remained, being well intentioned and without reproach, with Eutychos so 
long as he lives. But if Eutychos dies, these slaves place themselves before Asklepios in the care of Epitimos son of 
Samichos and Samichos and Kallikrates sons of Epitimos; and (that) these men shall serve as their prostatai and take 
care that their freedom should be secure, as Eutychos laid down(?), for all time. And whenever Eutychos dies Epitimos 
and Samichos and Kallikrates shall proclaim over the tomb that Eutychos sets free these slaves, according to the stele in 
the Asklapieion. 
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The owner declares the slaves free, “after they have served” (παρα[μει]|νάντεσι). But the 
manumission was not effective until the slaves’ prospective prostatai uttered the words over their former 
owner’s grave.94 Just as the Delphic sales were recorded but incomplete pending fulfillment of service 
and subsequent manumission, so also, in all of these cases, manumission was announced, but remained 
unexecuted until completion of paramone. 
 We see the same in sales from elsewhere. At Phokian Tithora Nikaretos and Oinanthe sold a 
slave named Euphrosyna to Sarapis “on condition of freedom, on condition that she be free and 
untouchable after having remained (παραμείνασαν) by Nikaretos and Oinanthe for the duration of their 
lives.”95 Two contemporary sales from the same place indicate that slaves have been sold to Sarapis on 
condition of freedom (ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ) and stipulate that the slaves “will serve” their former owners 
(παρμεν<ε>ῖ) so long as the latter live, but are to be free “from the perspective of everyone else” (τοῖς 
λοιποῖς).96 A sale from Amphissa permits the former masters, who sold the slave to Asklepios “on 
condition that she remain” (ὥστε παρα[μέ]|νῃ) by them, to punish her as they like, but then stipulates 
that “for all other people (ποτὶ δὲ τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας) [she] is to be free and untouchable.”97 These 
three sales are thought to show a kind of perspectival freedom, under which a person might be a slave 
from one point of view and free from another.98 But one of the Phokian sales states that the two slaves 
who had been sold were to “remain slaving” (παρμεν<ε>ῖ … δουλεύουσαι), leaving no doubt that 
these odd expressions might have meant freedom from the grasp of others but not in a court of law.99 At 
law, liberty was not a matter of perspective. Law did not, say, permit a person to be at once barred from 
marriage by a former master and yet free to marry “from the perspective of everyone else.” These 
owners sold slaves on the promise of freedom, pending completion of service, during which time the 
former owners promised to protect slaves from abuse by others. A fine gesture, like similar, occasional 
instances of moderation seen at Delphi, but the slavery was no less complete for it. 
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 Such executory transactions, whether sale, dedication, or manumission per se neither conferred 
freedom only to partly withdraw it nor minted half-slaves; they simply defined the terms governing 
future manumission. Where they stipulated paramone with a circumstantial participle they almost 
invariably used the aorist, indicating that manumission and the final execution of the transaction were to 
take place after paramone.100 Regardless of the legal mechanism used to effect a slave’s freedom, 
practice was remarkably consistent on this one overlapping point of law, logic, and grammar: that slaves 
alienated by any of these acts are to be transformed from fully enslaved to fully free; that, with very few 
exceptions,101 such transformation was to follow paramone and not to precede it; that the temporal 
priority of this fixed and finite service is most often indicated with the aorist participle or imperative.  
 
Testamentary Manumission 
The philosophers’ wills preserved by Diogenes Laertius show the same staging. Like the Delphic sales, 
these have been thought to illustrate the creation of partially free freedman. Aristotle (d. 322) directed in 
his will (D.L. 5.14–16): 
εἶναι δὲ καὶ Ἀμβρακίδα ἐλευθέραν καὶ δοῦναι αὐτῇ, ὅταν ἡ παῖς ἐκδοθῇ, πεντακοσίας δραχμὰς καὶ τὴν 
παιδίσκην ἣν ἔχει. ... Τύχωνα δ’ ἐλεύθερον εἶναι, ὅταν ἡ παῖς ἐκδοθῇ, καὶ Φίλωνα καὶ Ὀλύμπιον καὶ τὸ παιδίον 
αὐτοῦ. μὴ πωλεῖν δὲ τῶν παίδων μηδένα τῶν ἐμὲ θεραπευόντων, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς· ὅταν δ’ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ 
γένωνται, ἐλευθέρους ἀφεῖναι κατ’ ἀξίαν. 
 
that Ambrakis is to be free and (one is) to give her, whenever my daughter is married off, 500 drachmas and the slave 
girl whom she has. … and that Tychon is to be free whenever my daughter is married off, as is Philon and Olympios and 
his child; (one is) not to sell any of the slaves who serve me, but to use them, and to set them free whenever they are of 
age, as worthy.  
Some of Aristotle’s slaves were to continue in service to a new master, until his daughter married, others 
until they came of age. The will, if Diogenes represents it accurately, did not refer to this delay as 
paramone, although the stipulation is otherwise indistinguishable from paramone as imposed by the 
other wills. Theophrastus (d. 286) did specify paramone, directing that (D.L. 5.54–55): 
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Πομπύλῳ δὲ καὶ Θρέπτῃ πάλαι ἐλευθέροις οὖσι καὶ ἡμῖν πολλὴν χρείαν παρεσχημένοις, εἴ τι πρότερον 
ἔχουσι παρ’ ἡμῶν καὶ εἴ τι αὐτοὶ ἐκτήσαντο καὶ ἃ νῦν παρ’ Ἱππάρχου αὐτοῖς συντέταχα, δισχιλίας δραχμάς, 
ἀσφαλῶς οἶμαι δεῖν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ταῦτα, καθάπερ καὶ αὐτὸς διελέχθην Μελάντῃ καὶ Παγκρέοντι 
πλεονάκις καὶ πάντα μοι συγκατετίθεντο. δίδωμι δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ Σωματάλην [καὶ] τὴν παιδίσκην. [55] τῶν δὲ 
παίδων Μόλωνα μὲν καὶ Τίμωνα καὶ Παρμένοντα ἤδη ἐλευθέρους ἀφίημι· Μανῆν δὲ καὶ Καλλίαν 
παραμείναντας ἔτη τέτταρα ἐν τῷ κήπῳ καὶ συνεργασαμένους καὶ ἀναμαρτήτους γενομένους ἀφίημι 
ἐλευθέρους. 
 
To Pompylos and Threpte, who are long since free and have offered us much service, if they have any prior thing from 
us and if they themselves have acquired anything, including what I have now commanded they have from Hipparchos, 
namely 2,000 drachmas, I am steadfast in thinking that these must belong to them, just as I myself also explained to 
Melantes and Pankreon many times and (as) they in all ways agreed with me. I give them also Somatale the slave girl. Of 
the slaves, I set free henceforth Molon and Timon and Parmenon. But I set free Manes and Kallias, after they have 
remained four years in the garden and have collaborated and been free from blame. 
To a couple freedmen who continued on in what sounds like remunerated service to their former owner 
Theophrastus promised total control over everything that they owned and gave additional money and 
human assets.102 Two current slaves were to be manumitted promptly (ἤδη), two others only “after 
having served” (παραμείναντας). Here too, then, paramone was conducted in a state of servitude and 
freedom granted only after its completion. 
 The will of Lykon of Troas (d. 225) records several manumissions, some of them framed on 
condition of paramone (DL 5.73):  
ἀφίημι δ’ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὴν τοῦ Μίκρου μητέρα καὶ Νοήμονα καὶ Δίωνα καὶ Θέωνα καὶ Εὐφράνορα καὶ 
Ἑρμείαν. καὶ Ἀγάθωνα δύο ἔτη παραμείναντα ἀφεῖσθαι ἐλεύθερον· καὶ τοὺς φορεαφόρους Ὠφελίωνα καὶ 
Ποσειδώνιον τέτταρα ἔτη παραμείναντας. 
 
I set free also the mother of Mikros and Noemon and Dion and Theon and Euphranor and Hermeia. And (I stipulate in 
my will) to have Agathon set free, after he has remained for two years, and the litter-bearers Ophelion and Poseidonios 
after they have remained for four years. 
It is suggested that some of the philosopher’s slaves “are freed but are required to ‘remain’ 
(parameinanta) in some capacity for fixed lengths of time.”103 But, here again, the Greek denotes the 
opposite order of events. Agathon, Ophelion, and Poseidonios were not freed on the condition that they 
remain; they remained, as slaves, under the promise of subsequent manumission. The terms were not 
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service after manumission, but manumission “after service” (παραμείναντα, παραμείναντας). Those 
who remained were neither free nor half-free nor conditionally free; they were slaves. 
 A few clauses earlier, though, Lykon seems to envisage service performed after manumission 
(5.72): 
Δημητρίῳ μὲν ἐλευθέρῳ πάλαι ὄντι ἀφίημι τὰ λύτρα καὶ δίδωμι πέντε μνᾶς καὶ ἱμάτιον καὶ χιτῶνα, ἵνα 
πολλὰ πεπονηκὼς μετ’ ἐμοῦ βίον εὐσχήμονα ἔχῃ. Κρίτωνι δὲ Χαλκηδονίῳ, καὶ τούτῳ τὰ λύτρα ἀφίημι καὶ 
δίδωμι τέτταρας μνᾶς. 
 
For Demetrios, who is free for some time now, I waive the lytra and give him five minas and a himation and chiton so 
that, since he has labored much with me, he may have a becoming life. And for Kriton of Chalkedon, for him too I waive 
the lytra and give him five minas. 
On one view, these two slaves “had been manumitted on condition that they remain and work for Lycon 
and that Lycon’s will was meant to cover the possibility that he might die before the term of their further 
services expired.”104 But as we just saw, this very will establishes that freedom was granted after 
paramone. If Demetrios and Kriton had been free, then they would not have been subject to paramone. 
In fact, the will merely states that they owed Lykon money. The Roberts were right, I suggest, when 
they observed that the lytra probably referred to ransom (Bull.épigr. [1946] 87). Demetrios and Kriton 
had at some point been enslaved and ransomed with money furnished by Lykon, so that the two men 
were free but indebted. Demetrios had once been a slave, but that was irrelevant. The will stipulates that 
if Lykon should die before repayment, the debts would be forgiven. But no one was to be half-free or 
any such thing. 
 Wills, or clauses from them, were sometimes inscribed (e.g. IG V,2 274.I): ἐπὶ ἱερέος τῶ {ι} | 
Ποσιδᾶνος Ἀπ|ολλωνίου, δεκ|τῆρος δὲ Μάρκου | τοῦ Τίτου, ἔτους ἑ|βδόμου καὶ 
τεσαρα|κοστοῦ, διαθήκης ἀν|αγνωσθείσης ζʹ μην|ὸς Τρίτου τριακάδι Πιτ|ύλος Ποσειδίπου 
ἀφῆ|κε τὰν ἰδίαν θεράπαιν|αν ἐλευθέραν Σαφὼ | καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἑατᾶς παιδίον | Ὀνησιφόρον 
μηδενὶ μη|δὲν προσήκοντες.105 It is thought that “Such wills were, in fact, delayed manumissions; 
they protracted slavery in spite of the declaration of freedom.”106 But this conflates the act of writing 
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with the fact of execution. The legal state of slavery ended only with death or manumission, but Pitylos’ 
will framed upon drafting, and later effected upon execution, an end to Sapho’s servitude. Prior to 
execution there was no legal “declaration” of anything. Had he not so disposed, his heirs would have 
inherited the human property. Similarly, in his will, Dion stipulated (P.Petr. I2 3.19–23): 
  Μελαινίδα δὲ 
 20 [καὶ τὸν υἱὸν] α̣ὐτ̣ῆς Ἀμμώνιον τὸν ἐξ ἐμο̣ῦ γεγενημένον, οὓς ἐγὼ ἐξ[έθ]ρε- 
  [ψα, ἀφίημι ἐλ]ευθέρους, ἐάμ μοι παραμείνω[σ]ι̣ν̣ ἕως ἂν ἐγὼ ζῶ ὑπήκοο̣[ι ὄ]ν-̣ 
  [τες. ἀφίημι δ’] α̣ὐτοῖς τὰ τροφεῖα καὶ ἔστωσαν ἐλεύθεροι καθὰ καὶ ἐξ ὠ̣ν̣ῆς 
  [  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ μηθε]νὶ ἐξέστω ἐπιλα̣β̣έσθαι αὐτῶν παρ̣[ευρ]έσει μ[ηδ]ε̣μ̣[ιᾶι].  
 
But Melainis and her son Ammonios, who was born by me, whom I raised, I set free, if they serve me so long as I live, 
being obedient. And I waive for them the tropheia and they are to be free just as according to purchase….107 It shall be 
possible for no one to lay hands on them on any pretext. 
Clarysse worried that “[f]rom a strictly juridical point of view” this service could not be paramone, such 
as we know it from elsewhere, “since Melainis and her son are to be set free only after Dion’s death. The 
tasks they perform ‘so long as he lives’ are not paramone-tasks, but real slaves’ services;” and further 
that, “the service of Melainis and Ammonios, who were no doubt informed of the clause in the will 
relating to them, was considered a paramone, even if this was not correct from a strictly juridical point 
of view.”108 But it is the modern interpretation that is incorrect; the legal form was sound, as was 
Clarysse’s sense that something was odd. Mother and son were to continue to serve as slaves until the 
death of the Dion, and only then, assuming satisfactory completion of service and execution of the will, 
were they to become free. Protraction is the opposite of what testamentary manumission accomplished, 
whether the will stipulated paramone or not.  
 In none of these wills did a testator deal in halves. Some slaves were freed. Others were told 
when they would be. Not one was freed but nevertheless compelled to serve like a slave. While 
Pompylos and Threpte, and Demetrios, all freed in their former owners’ lifetime, may have been obliged 
‘not to depart’ from Theophrastus and Lykon (if the rule was still enforced at Athens), the freedmen 
produced by these wills were simply aliens, possibly metics if they stayed. Prior to manumission they 
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were slaves and subject to paramone, in precisely the same way that the slaves sold at Delphi were. But 
at no point were they anything other than one or the other of these two legal statuses. It is not true that 
“The wills of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Lycon imply that manumitted slaves were not wholly free in 
relation to their manumittor,”109 and, under the circumstances, such was a legal and logical 
impossibility. Even if metics were still required to register prostatai in the third century,110 none of the 
freedmen minted by the philosophers’ wills could have registered his or her manumittor as prostates; all 
of them were manumitted by written act of a dead non-citizen. These freedmen were as free from their 
manumittors as a person could be. 
 
Athenian ʻSecular Fictive Salesʼ  
It has recently been argued that at Athens, as at Delphi, manumitted slaves suffered “conditional 
freedom;” that, although paramone is not explicitly attested at Athens before the third century, 
“paramonê-like legal obligations certainly”111 existed there earlier, reducing manumitted individuals to a 
state of half-slavery; that this explains the legal situation of the only two fourth-century manumissions 
that we know in any detail from Athenian sources; that both of these were cognate “secular fictive 
sales,”112 examples of “a procedure known as ‘sale for the purpose of freedom’ (prasis ep’ 
eleutheriai).”113 
 The cases are well known. An Athenian named Epikrates lusted after a slave boy who, along 
with his brother and father, worked in the perfume shop of an Egyptian metic, Athenogenes.114 He 
offered to pay Athenogenes to free the boy so that he could employ him as a sex worker. Unbeknownst 
to Epikrates, however, the slaves had acquired significant debts so that Athenogenes preferred not to 
manumit them but rather to sell them, along with the debt.115 So, he conspired with the prostitute 
Antigona to trick Epikrates into purchasing all three slaves, along with the debts. As part of the ruse, she 
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claimed that she had only just managed to convince Athenogenes to free the slaves, and that Epikrates 
had better move quickly lest the deal collapse (Hyp. 3.4 [col.ii]): 
τέλος δ’ οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μακρολογῶ, μεταπεμψαμέν[η] γάρ με πάλιν ὕστερον εἶπεν, ὅτι πολλ̣ο̣ὺ̣ς̣ λόγους 
ἀναλώσασα πρὸς τ̣ὸν Ἀθηνογένην μόλις εἴη συμπεπεικ[υ]ῖα αὐτὸν ἀπολῦ̣σαί μοι τόν τε Μίδαν κα[ὶ τ]οὺς υἱεῖς 
ἀμ̣φ̣οτέρους τετταράκοντα μνῶν, καὶ ἐκέλ̣ε̣υέ με τὴν ταχίστην πορίζει̣ν τὸ ἀργύριο[ν], πρὶν μεταδόξαι τι 
Ἀθηνογέ̣νει. 
 
So, finally, not to go on too long, having sent for me again later, she said that having spent long discussions with 
Athenogenes she had just barely persuaded him to release for me Midas and both of his sons for 40 minas, and she kept 
urging me to come up with the money as quickly as possible, before Athenogenes changed his mind at all.  
Epikrates was hooked. But when he met with Athenogenes he was presented with quite a different offer; 
he reports (Hyp. 3.5–6 [col.ii–iii]): 
‘καὶ νῦν’ ἔφη ‘ταύτης ἕνεκα ἤδη σοι ἐνδείξ̣ομαι, ὅσα σε̣ ἀ̣γα̣[θὰ] ποιήσω. σ̣ὺ μὲ[ν γάρ]’ ἔ̣φη̣ ‘[τὸ] ἀργύριον ἐπ’ 
ἐλευθερίᾳ καταβαλε̣[ῖ]ς̣ το̣[ῦ Μίδο]υ̣ καὶ τῶν παίδων· ἐγὼ δέ σοι ἀποδώ[σ]ομαι αὐτοὺς ὠνῆι καὶ πράσε[ι], 
ἵνα π̣ρ̣ῶτο̣ν̣ μὲν μηδείς [σ]ε̣ [ἐ]νοχ[λ]ῇ [μ̣η]δὲ διαφθείρ[ῃ] τὸν π̣[α]ῖ̣δα, ἔ[π̣]ε[ι]τ̣’ αὐτοὶ μ̣ὴ̣ ἐ̣γχειρῶσι 
π̣[ο]νηρε[ύ]εσθαι μηδὲν διὰ τὸν φόβ̣[ον]. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον· νῦν μὲν ἂν δόξειαν δι’ ἐμὲ γεγονέναι ἐλεύθεροι· ἐὰν δὲ 
πριάμενος σὺ ὠνῆι καὶ πράσει εἶθ’ ὕστερον, ὅτε ἄν σοι δοκῆι, ἀφῆις αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους, διπλασίαν ἕξουσίν σοι 
τὴν χάριν. 
 
“And now,” he said, “for her sake I shall show you how much good I shall do you. For you,” he said, “are about to put 
down the money on condition of freedom for Midas and his children. But I shall sell them to you, ‘by purchase and sale,’ 
so that, first of all, no one may bother you or ruin the child, and, next, so that they, owing to fear, may not endeavor to 
misbehave in any way. But most importantly, as things are, they would think that they have become free because of me. 
But if, buying them ‘by purchase and sale,’ you then later set them free, whenever you like, they will have twice the 
gratitude for you.”  
Epikrates’ original proposal was to pay (καταβαλε̣[ῖ]ς)̣ Athenogenes money on condition that he free 
the slaves for him. This was not to be a purchase or sale, and no one in the speech calls it a prasis ep’ 
eleutheriai or any such thing.116 In fact, it is explicitly contrasted with sale. This was to be payment of 
cash on condition of mutual performance: Epikrates would pay money, and Athenogenes would free the 
slaves. Athenogenes, however, convinced Epikrates that it would be better to buy the slaves outright. 
The lustful man was so eager that he scarcely read the contract before agreeing; he failed to notice that 
he was buying the debts too.117 
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 Now, had Athenogenes accepted the original proposal he would have freed the slaves and 
handed them over to Epikrates. But if they were free, why would they have gone with Epikrates? On one 
view, they would have been under an implicit obligation to ‘remain’ in a state of half-freedom like those 
slaves who were freed at Delphi on explicit condition of paramone.118 At Athens, a manumitted slave 
became a free non-citizen, an alien if he left and a metic if he stayed.119 All metics were required to 
register a prostates or else be liable to graphe aprostasiou.120 A freedman metic was subject to an 
additional requirement to abide by his former owner or else face legal action:121 
Harp. s.v. Ἀποστασίου: δίκη τίς ἐστι κατὰ τῶν ἀπελευθερωθέντων δεδομένη τοῖς ἀπελευθερώσασιν, ἐὰν 
ἀφιστῶνταί τε ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἢ ἕτερον ἐπιγράφωνται προστάτην, καὶ ἃ κελεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι μὴ ποιῶσιν. καὶ 
τοὺς μὲν ἁλόντας δεῖ δούλους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ νικήσαντας τελέως ἤδη ἐλευθέρους. πολλάκις δ’ ἐστὶ παρὰ τοῖς 
ῥήτορσι, παρὰ τῷ Λυσίᾳ ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἀριστόδημον καὶ Ὑπερείδῃ ἐν τῷ κατὰ Δημητρίας ἀποστασίου. 
 
There is an action that was granted against freedmen to those who freed them, if they depart from them or register 
another as prostates, and if they do not do what the laws bid; and those who are convicted must become slaves, while 
those who win (the case) shall be fully free thenceforth. Occurs often in the orators, in Lysias in the speech against 
Aristodemos and in Hyperides in the speech against Demetrias for apostasiou.  
To Finley, this provision was consistent with the half-freedom that Delphic paramone is thought to have 
created. He translated, “And those who are condemned necessarily become slaves, but those who win, 
already being free men, become so completely.”122 But this mangles the Greek, and even if it did not, 
this rule was not at all like Delphic paramone, which required a slave who had been sold to serve 
someone other than his new owner, on the promise of subsequent manumission. But never mind, for 
there is no reason to think that these three freedmen would, or even could, have been so constrained in 
the first place. The governing rules, such as we know them, compelled (1) every metic to register a 
prostates, or else face graphe aprostasiou, and (2) every freedman metic to name his manumittor for 
that role, or else face dike apostasiou by his manumittor. But, prostatai were to be citizens,123 so that if a 
freedman’s manumittor was himself a metic he had no remedy against a freedman who did not 
comply—and indeed could not—with the second rule. The freedman will have followed the first and 
that was that. Athenogenes was a metic, so that, if Midas and sons “registered another as prostates,” 
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Athenogenes could not have brought a dike apostasiou against them and neither could anyone else.124 
Like all metics, they would have needed a prostates, but as far as Athenian law could recognize and 
enforce, they would have been no one’s freedmen.125 
 Scholars understand the requirement that a freedman register his manumittor as prostates and 
abide by him as a curtailment of the freedman’s liberty. But the ancient sources, admittedly late and 
limited, frame the rule as a positive protection of the manumittor’s rights: “a legal action available to 
those who have manumitted.” If the rule was framed as a benefit to manumittors and a manumittor was 
ineligible, it will have served no purpose under the rule to compel either freedman or manumittor to find 
some other eligible candidate for prostates.126 Thus, I suggest, if Athenogenes had accepted the initial 
offer, the three new metics would have enrolled Epikrates as their prostates, but since he would not have 
been their manumittor they would have been under no legal obligation “not to depart” from him. In his 
initial offer Epikrates was asking Athenogenes to release the freedmen into his care,127 and leave it to 
him to sort out the rest; he would see that the newly minted metics enrolled him as their prostates.128 
Legally, they would have been free. The social and economic constraints under which they would have 
operated would have been considerable, and Epikrates did have in mind to engage the free boy to 
particular ends that the latter may not have wanted or even known of, but legal freedom mattered. A 
slave could be beaten, tortured, sold, deprived of family, excluded from courts, and so on, without 
recourse to legal remedy. These three could not. 
 Hyperides was an expert in this domain (Ath. Deipn. 13.58 [590c-d] = Idomeneus of Lampsakos, 
FGrHist 338 F15):129 
Ὑπερείδης δ’ ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκ τῆς πατρῴας οἰκίας τὸν υἱὸν ἀποβαλὼν Γλαύκιππον Μυρρίνην τὴν 
πολυτελεστάτην ἑταίραν ἀνέλαβε, καὶ ταύτην μὲν ἐν ἄστει εἶχεν, ἐν Πειραιεῖ δὲ Ἀρισταγόραν, Φίλαν δ’ ἐν 
Ἐλευσῖνι, ἣν πολλῶν ὠνησάμενος χρημάτων εἶχεν ἐλευθερώσας, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ οἰκουρὸν αὐτὴν ἐποιήσατο 
 
The orator Hypereides, having expelled his son Glaukippos from his ancestral home, brought in Myrrhine, the most 
expensive prostitute, and used to keep her in the city, and Aristagora in Peiraieus, and Phila in Eleusis, whom, having 
purchased her for a lot of money, he used to keep, after he had freed her, and later even made her his house-mistress. 
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Whether Myrrhine was a slave (and if so, whose) or free, we are not told. It is suggested that Hyperides 
‘bought’ Phila via fictive sale; that he provided the funds for her manumission, much as Epikrates had 
proposed to do.130 But here again the Greek tells a different order of events: first he bought her, then he 
freed her, and then he started keeping her (ὠνησάμενος … εἶχεν ἐλευθερώσας). He did not do what 
Epikrates proposed, but what Athenogenes tricked Epikrates into doing! Presumably, Hyperides was 
Phila’s prostates. More complicated is Hyperides’ relationship with Aristagora, against whom he either 
brought a graphe aprostasiou, or else wrote a speech for someone who did, whether before or after the 
engagement of which Idomeneus speaks, we do not know.131 There is no evidence here of fictive sale or 
of anything resembling paramone. 
 Even better known is the case of the famous prostitute Neaira, who at one point was the joint 
property of two Corinthians, Eukrates and Timanoridas. Now, one or both of them was about to get 
married and did not wish to see her working at Corinth or owned by a brothel-keeper.132 So, instead of 
selling Neaira they offered to free her if she would pay them 20 minas. Wanting to accept but lacking 
the funds, she sent for several former lovers, including an Athenian, Phrynion, gathered money from a 
number of them, contributed her own savings, and persuaded the man to add the difference and “pay her 
sum to Eukratides and Timanoridas on condition that she be free.”133 Phrynion paid the men twenty 
minas “on (Neaira’s) condition that she be free and on (their) condition that she not work in Corinth.”134 
Apollodoros does not call this transaction a ‘prasis ep’ eleutheriai,’ or any other kind of sale or 
purchase, neither of Neaira nor of her freedom.135 Money was paid on condition of mutual exchange of 
promises, one of which was subsequent manumission. We may no more call this exchange a πρᾶσις ἐπ’ 
ἐλευθερίᾳ than we can call it a πρᾶσις ἐπὶ τῷ ἐν Κορίνθῳ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι. It was not a sale at all. In 
a strange irony, at Delphi, the transactions call themselves sales and bear all resemblance to the same, 
and yet scholars believe that they were not; while here, the transactions are not described as sales and 
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yet scholars believe that they were. Whatever the terms of their agreement and whatever they may have 
called it, Neaira left town with Phrynion a free woman. 
 Why, then, did she stay with Phrynion? We do not know Corinthian law on the rights and 
obligations of freedmen and their former owners. But since Neaira was about to emigrate, she could not 
have been subject to such for long. Neaira had an obligation, under the terms of her manumission, not to 
work in Corinth, but that was between her and her manumittors. Phrynion was neither her manumittor, 
nor her current or previous owner, nor a putative Corinthian prostates. She was under no legal obligation 
not to ‘depart’ from him. The two collaborated to secure her manumission but we hear nothing of a 
contract. When Neaira later returned to Athens with Stephanos, having fled from Phrynion, who had 
become abusive, Phrynion attempted to take her back, threatening to sue, under a claim that she was his 
slave. He did not charge that she was in violation of any agreement to ‘remain,’ or a requirement to 
abide by her prostates, or a contract to provide sexual services, or a “paramonê-like legal obligation” or, 
indeed, any other obligation.136 If she had been so bound, we would expect Phrynion to have sued for 
violation of law or terms, but not to have seized her person on grounds that she was unfree: wrongful 
seizure of a free person was a serious crime.137  
 It has been suggested that Neaira “had to remain with Phrynion and serve him;”138 that he had a 
valid claim to her person for two reasons. First, “Neaera was considered to belong to Phrynion even 
after her manumission, presumably because she still owed him money,”139 an assumption for which 
Apollodoros provides no support.140 Moreover, “all or most manumission agreements included the 
slave’s obligation to supply further services,” whether stated in the epigraphic documentation or not, so 
that “[w]hat distinguished manumissions with paramone clauses” from those that did not require service 
“was not the fact that they were conditional or that they obligated a slave to remain with the ex-owner; 
rather the distinctive feature was that all obligations associated with manumission were secured in a 
formal contract.”141 In other words, the 800 or so inscribed Delphic slave sales that do not stipulate 
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paramone did require it, but implictly, extra-contractually, and those that did stipulate paramone 
differed only inasmuch as the requirement was explicit, contractual. Thus, Neaira must have been bound 
to obey Phrynion because paramone, whether stipulated or not, was the default requirement of “all or 
most” manumissions. This would be alarming if true.142 The private arbitrators who settled the dispute, 
which did not go to court, do not appear to have thought Neaira was subject to any such performance; 
they ruled that she was “free and her own mistress.”143 If Neaira had accompanied Phrynion under legal 
compulsion, or arrived at Athens as anything but a free alien, it would have been in Apollodoros’ 
interest to say so. There was nothing to say. Her manumission had taken place outside Athenian 
jurisdiction; she could not be compelled at Athens to register her Corinthian manumittors as prostatai! If 
her intent was to stay there she will have been required to register a prostates, and Phrynion will likely 
have served that role. But she would have been subject to this requirement as a metic, not as a former 
slave who had been manumitted under the laws of another polity.  
 To recapitulate, under Epikrates’ original proposal to Athenogenes, the three slaves would not 
have been sold. They would have left Athenogenes’ premises and control as free, (surely) resident, non-
citizens. As metics, they would have been required to register a prostates, most likely Epikrates. They 
would also have been freedmen and so required to register their manumittor as their prostates; but since 
Athenogenes was a metic, he could not have sued if they registered Epikrates. Their freedom would not 
have been conditional in any extraordinary legal sense. Epikrates would have been able to wield social 
and economic power over the former slaves. But his legal power as their prostates would have been 
limited. Indeed, fear that the three might cause him trouble—perhaps even leave—if they came to him 
free, seems to have motivated him to purchase the slaves outright.144 Neaira was not sold to Phrynion, 
but went with him as a free woman. Whatever power Phrynion had over her was a social fact, apparently 
unsecured by legal covenant. If she stayed with him in Athens beyond a month or so, she would have 
been required to register as a metic and declare a prostates, who would almost certainly have been 
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Phrynion. This pair of constraints was no greater than that experienced by any other free female resident 
alien and did not derive from her profession or prior legal status. Her freedom was as full and 
unconditional as law and social norms granted. She neither “had to remain with Phrynion and serve 
him”145 nor did. She left. Neither Neiaira’s manumission nor that proposed for the perfumery workers 
was a sale of any form, and neither was called a ‘prasis ep’ eleutheriai.’ Neither was subject to an 
implicit condition to ‘remain,’ whether called by paramone or any other word.  
 The “secular fictive sale” called  “prasis ep’ eleutheriai” does not appear to have existed, but an 
inscription from Beroia records a transaction that does seem to be cognate with Neaira’s manumssion 
and that proposed by Epikrates.146 Three slaves “paid” their owner “on condition of freedom,” 
(κατέβαλον ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίαι), a phrase that bears close likeness to those seen at Hyp. 3.5 [col.ii] ([τὸ] 
ἀργύριον ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ καταβαλε̣[ῖ]ς̣) and [Dem.] 59.32 (κατατίθησιν αὐτῆς τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς τῷ 
Εὐκράτει καὶ τῷ Τιμανορίδᾳ ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἐφ’ ᾧ ἐν Κορίνθῳ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι). Unlike Neaira 
and the others, these three were subject to paramone (I.Beroia 45): 
 κατέβαλον ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίαι Κόσμος, 
5 Μαρσύας, Ὄρτυξ, Ἀττίναι Ἀλκέτου αὐτοὶ ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν vac. 
 καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν vac. Ἀρνίου, Γλαύκας, vac. Χλιδάνης, 
 καὶ τῶν παιδίων τῶν τε νῦν ὄντων καὶ ἄν τινα ὕστερον̣ 
 ἐπιγένηται καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς πάντων ἑκάσ- 
 του χρυσοῦς πεντήκοντα vac. καὶ <Ἀ>σπαζᾶτις ὑπὲρ αὑ- 
10 τῆς καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων κατέβαλεν χρυσοῦς 
 εἴκοσι πέντε, παραμείνασιν δὲ αὐτοῖς παρὰ vac. 
 Ἀττίναι ἕως ἂν Ἀττίνας ζῆι καὶ ποοῦσιν ὅ τι ἂν Ἀτ- 
 τίνας προστάσσῃ, παθόν<τος> δὲ Ἀττίνα ἐξέστω ἀπιιέναι 
 οὗ ἂν βούλωνται. vac. μὴ ἐξέστω δὲ Ἀλκέται μηδὲ τῆι Ἀλ- 
15 κέτα γυναικὶ μηδὲ τῶν Ἀλκέτα ἐγγόνων μηδὲ Λαρέ- 
 ται ἐφάψεσθαι τούτων μηδὲ τῶν γυναικῶν μηδὲ 
 τῶν παιδίων μηδὲ Ἀσπαζάτιος, μηδὲ ἄγειν εἰς δου- 
 λ̣είαν, μηδὲ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς παρελέσθαι μ̣η̣δ̣ὲ̣[ν] 
 π̣[α]ρευρέσει μηδεμιᾶι μηδὲ ἄλλωι ὑπὲρ τούτων· εἰ δὲ μή, 
20 ἐλεύθεροί τε ἔστωσαν καὶ ὁ ἄγων εἰς δουλείαν ἀποτινέτω 
 καθ’ ἕκαστον vac. σ<ῶ>μα χρυσοῦς ἑκατὸν καὶ τῶι βασιλεῖ vac. 
 ἄλλους ἑκατὸν ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου σώματος καὶ ἄν τι ἐκ̣ [τ]ῶ[ν] 
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 ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς παρέληται, ἀποτινέτω τὴ̣ν ἀξί- 
 αν διπλῆν οὗ ἂν παρέληται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ παραμένω- 
25 σι μηδὲ ποιῶσιν ὅ τι ἂν Ἀττίνας προστάσσῃ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ α̣ἱ 
 γυναῖκες καὶ τ̣ὰ π̣α̣ι̣δ̣ί̣α̣, ἕως ἂν Ἀττίνας ζῆι, τῶι μὴ ποιοῦντ̣ι̣ 
 ἄκυρος ἔστω ἡ̣ ἐλε̣υθ̣ερία αὖ· 
 
Kosmos, Marsyas, and Ortyx paid Attinas, daughter of Alketas, on condition of freedom, themselves on hehalf of 
themselves, and on behalf of their wives, Arnias, Glauka, and Chlidane, and their children, both those who exist now and 
if any is born later, and for all that belongs to them, fifty gold staters each. And Aspazatis paid on behalf of herself and 
and her belongings 25 gold staters. And it shall be possible for them, after they have remained with Attinas for as long as 
Attinas lives, and do whatever Attinas commands, and when Attinas dies, to depart wherever they wish.  
 
[14] But it shall not be possible for Alketas nor Alketas’ wife nor Alketas’ offspring, nor Lareta to lay hands on them, or 
their wives, or their children, or Aspazatis, nor to lead (them) into slavery, nor to seize any of their belongings on any 
pretext, nor for another (to do so) on their behalf. Otherwise they shall be free and the one who leads them into slavery 
shall pay as a fine for each person 100 gold staters, and to the king another (100) each for each person, and if one seizes 
anything from their belongings he shall pay as a fine twice the value of whatever he seized from them. 
 
[24] If they do not remain and do whatever Attinas commands—both they and their wives and children—so long as 
Attinas lives, then for him who does not perform the freedom shall then be invalid. 
Here too, the legal action is unambiguously neither sale with paramone (ἀπέδοτο ἐφ’ ὧιτε 
ἐλευθέρους εἶμεν, παραμεινάτωσαν δέ), nor dedication (ἀνατίθητι δούλως παραμείναντας), nor 
even, by itself, manumission with the same (ἀφῆκεν ἐλευθέρους παραμείναντας). Let’s not assign an 
official-sounding designation like ‘payment on condition of freedom.’ This is a contract under which 
slaves pay owners money on condition of mutual performance: slaves are to remain by their master, as 
slaves, for the duration of her life, and upon her demise they are to be free, presumably made so by their 
owner’s heir. If this arrangement were contracted without stipulation of paramone, it would look similar 
to the other two cases in which someone “paid” money “on condition of freedom.” The three slaves are 
to be permitted, “after they have remained” (παραμείνασιν) with Attinas, “doing” (ποοῦσιν) her 
bidding, to leave. Here again, we find the same careful articulation of the transaction’s order of events: 
first, payment on condition of subsequent manumission, then, paramone performed in a state of 
servitude, and finally, manumission upon death of the person to whom service is owed. This 
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Macedonian text seems to give us our third example of a transaction in which cash was paid on 
condition of subsequent manumission, where the operation was not bundled with a sale, dedication, or 
an explicitly named manumission. This one stipulated paramone; the other two, Neaira’s and the 
perfumery workers’, did not. 
 Paramone, such as we find at Delphi and elsewhere, was simply slave labor with a defined 
sunset that was inscribed as a condition either of a legal act that facilitated manumission—whether sale, 
dedication, or testamentary disposition—or a manumission per se. Neither Neaira nor Athenogenes’ 
slaves faced anything like that. Athenian law does appear to have entitled manumittors to make certain 
demands of their freedmen. But we scarcely know what these were and it is a leap to equate the 
freedman’s obligation to his manumittor with a legal state of half-slavery. For all we know, as Harrison 
observed of the Athenian requirement not to depart from a manumittor, “It may be that this phrase 
implies no more than that the laws imposed on the freedmen the duty of doing all those things which he 
had agreed to do at his manumission,”147 not working in Corinth, for example. 
 And while Neaira’s social liabilities, as a former slave, prostitute, woman, and alien, may have 
been significant, it is a mistake to think that the law imposed a formal disability as a direct and default 
result of her manumission. Phrynion brought legal action against Stephanos for two alleged wrongs: that 
Stephanos had removed Neaira to freedom unlawfully and that Stephanos had received the goods that 
she had allegedly stolen from Phrynion.148 Their associates persuaded them to go to binding arbitration, 
and the arbitrators ruled as follows ([Dem] 59.45–46):  
τὴν μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἐλευθέραν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴν αὑτῆς κυρίαν, ἃ δ’ ἐξῆλθεν ἔχουσα Νέαιρα παρὰ Φρυνίωνος 
χωρὶς ἱματίων καὶ χρυσίων καὶ θεραπαινῶν, ἃ αὐτῇ τῇ ἀνθρώπῳ ἠγοράσθη, ἀποδοῦναι Φρυνίωνι πάντα· 
συνεῖναι δ’ ἑκατέρῳ ἡμέραν παρ’ ἡμέραν· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀλλήλους πείθωσι, ταῦτα κύρια εἶναι· τὰ δ’ 
ἐπιτήδεια τῇ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν ἔχοντα ἀεὶ παρέχειν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ μὴ 
μνησικακεῖν.  
 
That the woman be free and under her own authority, but that those things that Neaira had in her possession when she 
left Phrynion, except for the clothing, gold, and servant-girls, which had been purchased for/by the woman herself, she is 
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to return to Phrynion in full. And that she is to be with each man day-for-day (i.e. in alternation). And that if they 
persuade each other in some other way, that shall be binding. That the man who keeps her is to provide necessities to the 
woman, and that they are to be friends with each other in future and not ‘remember ills.’  
Apparently, this is what they then did, at least for a time ([Dem] 59.48):  
Ὡς δ’ ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἦσαν, οἱ παρόντες ἑκατέρῳ ἐπὶ τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον οἶμαι φιλεῖ 
γίγνεσθαι ἑκάστοτε, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἑταίρας οὔσης αὐτοῖς τῆς διαφορᾶς, ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ᾖσαν ὡς ἑκάτερον 
αὐτῶν, ὁπότε καὶ Νέαιραν ἔχοιεν, καὶ αὑτηὶ συνεδείπνει καὶ συνέπινεν ὡς ἑταίρα οὖσα. 
 
And when they had been reconciled, those who were present for each party at the arbitration and proceedings—the sort 
of thing that I reckon tends to happen on all such occasions, and especially when people have a dispute concerning a 
hetaira—went to dinner at each man’s home, whenever each had Neaira, and she here always ate with them and drank 
with them, prostitute that she is. 
If this case had gone to trial such an outcome would have been impossible. We are not certain whether 
such prosecutions were brought against the free person who removed the alleged slave to freedom, the 
alleged slave, or—somehow—both.149 If one sued the ‘remover’ then if Stephanos was found to have 
rescued Neaira unlawfully he would have been subject to penalty and she would have been remanded to 
Phrynion, as a slave. If Stephanos was acquitted, then neither he nor Neaira could have been subject to 
judicial sanction. If one prosecuted the slave, then if Neaira was found to be a slave, she would have 
returned, in that state, to Phrynion; but if she was acquitted then there would have been no penalty phase 
and so no legal mechanism by which to compel her to do anything.  
 But this ruling was not issued by a jury, or anything like one. Jurors swore to vote in accordance 
with the laws; arbitrators did not. Women could not testify in court, but arbitrators could hear their 
stories. Juries listened to one or more pairs of prepared speeches and then voted to convict or acquit; 
arbitrators participated in discussions and then actively framed a course of action that disputants could 
tolerate. Jurors were numerous enough to be, as a group, arms-length from litigants; arbitrators were 
meant to be partisans, friends. A jury of Athenian males might have wished to attend parties with the 
famous and desirable Neaira, but the courts provided no mechanism to make that wish come true. 
Arbitration did. The ruling that Neaira should be free and yet compelled to split her time and body 
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between two men, neither of whom owned her, underscores the grotesque reach of Athenian misogyny 
and the social disability suffered by women, but says nothing about formal judicial recognition of half-
freedom or that such was the byproduct of manumission. At Athens, the rulings of private arbitrators 
were inescapable, beyond appeal, like the terms of a valid contract. The terms of Neaira’s manumission 
limited her freedom of movement by preventing her from working in Corinth, but that did not make her 
half-free. Neither did the arbitrators’ ruling; they imposed conditions that an Aristotle might have found 
incompatible with freedom. Arbitration could do that. As a woman, as a prostitute, as a former slave, 
Neaira may have been more susceptible than some to such rulings. But this was a feature of Athenian 
gender inequality, and while it had clear and deep legal ramifications, it was not a formal legal disability 
generated by the act of manumission. An extra-judicial panel of citizen friends whose charge is to find 
compromise within the bounds of normative social hierarchies might treat her in ways considered 
incompatible with liberty (a legal contract for debt-bondage could do the same).  But the verdict of a 
random selection of unknown peers sworn to vote up or down in strict accordance with the laws could 
recognize her as slave or free and nothing in between.  
 The kind of half-freedom that is thought to have been imposed in fourth-century Athens, under a 
mechanism whose name is unknown but whose legal basis was cognate with that of Delphic “sacral 
fictive sales” with paramone, did not exist. That is a fiction.150  
 
Paramone and bound labor 
Two bodies of material show a different legal construction of paramone. First there are the contracts 
most often attested on papyrus in the Roman imperial period, in which a free person received 
prepayment for services to be rendered and then subordinated himself to the creditor in a form of debt-
bondage,151 “working off a debt,” as Harpocration and Menander might have put it.152 Such bondage 
was, in a way, similar to slavery, but “similar” is not “same.” To contract paramone in Egypt was not to 
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forfeit one’s legal status as a free person; it was to bind oneself temporarily to another, which was 
neither illegal nor slavery. Perhaps such, like debt-bondage, was “sort of” slavery, on the comic stage.153 
Not in law though. 
 From Kalymna we have several dozen records of manumission, all from the first half of the first 
century after Christ. These were the not legal instruments of manumission themselves, but records of 
them. In a dozen or so cases slaves were freed without paramone. Some were simply set free, one on 
condition that she be her manumittor’s freedwoman alone, another that he be no one’s freedman.154 
Some were freed on the condition that they rear one or more children for their manumittors.155 Most 
were freed “in accordance with the freedmen laws” (ἀπελευθερωτικοὶ νόμοι); one was explicitly 
released from the “freedmen conventions” (ἀπελευθερωτικὰ δίκαια), which may have included some 
or all of the practices and regulations laid out in the “freedmen laws.”156 We do not know precisely what 
these laws were or did, but they may have defined services that manumittors were entitled to claim from 
their freedmen. And possibly the heritability of such as well, for the stipulation that a freed slave be no 
one’s freedman or the freedman of the manumittor alone, seems have been meant to short-circuit a 
convention under which freedmen owed obligations to their manumittors’s heirs, or even beyond. 
 The bulk of manumissions from Kalymna stipulated paramone, under two distinct formulas. In 
more than a dozen cases slaves were freed roughly as follows (e.g. Tit.Cal. 154.1–3): ἀφέθη 
[ἐλ]|ευθέρα Νικομήδεα ὑπὸ Διοκλεῦ̣̣ς καὶ Φιλαίων̣[ος, πα]|ραμίνασα, “Nikomedea was set free by 
Diokles and Philaion, after she has remained.”157 We have seen this construction already, with sales, 
dedications, testamentary and proclaimed manumissions. The aorist participle indicates that the slave 
was to be free after having performed paramone; that the legal act of manumission would not be fully 
executed until completion of service. In some of these cases, a freed slave was, upon the manumittor’s 
death, to be “no one’s freedman.”158 Paramone could be coextensive with an obligation to rear one or 
more children for manumittor(s) or their designee(s).159 Slaves who did not remain could be required to 
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pay reparations (ἀναφορά).160 It is not stated whether this payment was a straightforward fine or a 
commutation of servitude. Either way, practice here was more liberal than at Delphi, where failure to 
remain could result in beating, nullification of the sale and therefore the prospect of manumission, or 
even punitive re-sale; nothing like that is attested at Kalymna. But on the sequence of events implied by 
this formula we do find clear agreement: first paramone and then freedom.  
 Some two dozen manumissions, however, stipulated paramone with a different formula. Here, a 
master “freed” (most often ἠλευθέρωσεν)161 a slave “on condition that she will remain” (ἐφ’ ᾧτε 
παραμενεῖ) with her manumittor or designee for the duration of their lives,162 often with the 
requirement to rear one or more children.163 Here too, we find the occasional term-limitation of a 
freedman’s obligation to his manumittor or designee.164 Some released freed slaves from the “freedmen 
procedures.”165 In short, the menu of attachable conditions is essentially the same as above. But if the 
several options were the same, the underlying procedure, I propose, was not. We might expect the two 
formulas, “ἀφέθη X ὐπὸ Y” and “Y ἠλευθέρωσεν X,” to have been interchangeable. But while we find 
“ἀφέθη X ὐπὸ Y παραμείνας” and “Y ἠλευθέρωσεν X ἐφ’ ᾧτε παραμενεῖ,” the elements of these 
expressions are almost never mixed. Thus, “ἀφέθη X ὐπὸ Y ἐφ’ ᾧτε παραμενεῖ” appears once,166 but 
“Y ἠλευθέρωσεν X παραμείναντα” is unattested. This is not a coincidence, I urge, but a reflection of 
two distinct procedures. Under the one described by the formula “Y ἠλευθέρωσεν X ἐφ’ ᾧτε 
παραμενεῖ,” a master manumitted a slave on condition that the newly minted freedman remain with the 
master. So, Phileinos “made Tyche free, on condition that she rear a two-year old male slave for 
Phileinos and remain by Phileinos son of Theuphilos and Kallistrate, daughter of Theuphamos, son of 
Piston, who raised her, on condition that she will remain … not ungraciously, and will do all that is 
commanded, as many things as she used to do (ἐποίει) also as a slave, till the end of their lives.”167 This 
states clearly that Tyche used to be a slave and now performed paramone as a freedwoman. Thus, some 
manumissions from Kalymna broke with the tradition that we see elsewhere (and earlier) and imposed 
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paramone on freedmen; they were in this regard partly compatible with scholarly consensus, in a way 
that very few manumissions were.  
 If this suggestion is accepted, then we find at Kalymna a neatly articulated range of possible 
implementations of manumission with and without paramone, arranged here in roughly descending 
order of liberality. 
 
Manumission without paramone 
• Manumission with release from “freedmen procedures.” This was the most unrestricted form of manumission and is 
attested but once.168 In practical terms, though, it may have differed little from manumitting a slave as “no one’s 
freedman.”169 For, if the laws and procedures governing freedmen largely defined their obligations to their 
manumittors, then to be no one’s freedman was to escape the reach of these regulations. This was, in effect, to be 
like Neaira in Athens, or Athenogenes’ slaves, if he had manumitted them, or the slaves freed via the philosophers’ 
wills.  
• Manumission in accordance with the freedmen laws, on condition that the former slave be the manumittor’s freedman 
alone (Tit.Cal. 170, 181). This prevented the manumittor’s heirs from claiming a right to services from any of his 
freedmen. Inclusion of this condition suggests that heritability of claims to a freedman’s service was the default 
presumption. 
• Manumission (in accordance with the freedmen laws), with child-rearing requirement (Tit.Cal. 158, 160, 165(?), 
176b). 
 
Freedom, then paramone (Y ἠλευθέρωσεν X ἐφ’ ᾧτε παραμενεῖ) 
• Manumission followed by paramone, with release from the “freedmen procedures” (Tit.Cal. 184 [also carries child-
rearing obligation], 206[?]) This made a freedman subject to the requirements defined in the legal instrument that 
imposed paramone, but immune from whatever default obligations were imposed by law. 
• Manumission followed by paramone, with stipulation that freedman status shall cease with the death of the 
manumittor(s) or designee(s) (Tit.Cal. 171, 172, 176a, 177, 192a, 194, 198). This fixed the term for paramone and 
for a freedman’s default obligations. 
• Manumission followed by paramone, with child-rearing requirement and with stipulation that freedman status shall 
cease with the death of the manumittor or designee (Tit.Cal. 171, 176a). 
• Manumission followed by paramone (Tit.Cal. 173, 180, 193 [incudes free movement, “sailing in and out”], 195, 196a, 
202, 206, 207). Here the term of the freedman’s obligations to his manumittor or designee appears to be unlimited 
(except inasmuch as the freedmen laws may have imposed limits). 
• Manumission followed by paramone, with child-rearing requirement, without defined term for freedman’s obligations 
(Tit.Cal. 155, 174, 175, 179, 183, 184 [requires child-rearing but releases freedwoman from “freedmen 
procedures”], 191, 194, 197). 
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Paramone, then freedom (ἀφέθη X ὐπὸ Y παραµείνας) 
• Manumission on condition of prior paramone, with stipulation that freedman status shall cease with the death of the 
manumittor or designee (Tit.Cal. 153, 164, 187a). 
• Manumission on condition of prior paramone, with child-rearing requirement and with stipulation that freedman status 
shall cease with the death of the manumittor or designee (Tit.Cal. 156, 157). 
• Manumission on condition of prior paramone, without defined term for obligations to manumittor (Tit.Cal. 152, 154, 
159, 178). 
• Manumission on condition of prior paramone, with child-rearing requirement, without defined term for obligations to 
manumittor (Tit.Cal. 161, 163, 166, 187b, 199, 200). 
 
Segré suggested that there was in effect one basic procedure; that the ‘freedmen laws’ required 
paramone and rearing of children as a matter of course, so that to manumit simply “in accordance with 
the freedmen laws” was to require both, whether the document of record stated as much or not.170 But a 
number of features suggest that this might not be right. First, there is no reason to think that paramone 
was the default assumption in all manumissions; it certainly was not at Delphi, where we know most, or 
indeed anywhere else. At Kalymna, manumissions that require rearing of children almost always 
stipulate paramone as well,171 but manumissions that stipulate paramone do not always stipulate child 
rearing. The difference could easily arise from the fact that the two requirements were not linked by 
default. Moreover, at least one manumission does not stipulate paramone, but does require child rearing 
in addition to “the other things in accordance with the laws on apeleutheriosis.”172 This suggests that 
child rearing was not among the default obligations that freedpersons owed their manumittors. Most, 
importantly, though, Diophantos “freed a slave Agathopous, who has been released from the 
apeleutherotika dikaia. And he will remain by his birth mother Akte for the duration of her life, or else 
pay her 300 denarii;”173 if it was possible for Agathopous to be released from the legal procedure 
applying to freedmen and yet be subject to paramone, then paramone per se cannot have been the 
default obligation that a freedman owed a manumittor. These factors, along with the apparent 
differentiation of formulaic expressions, suggest that two different implementations of paramone existed 
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at Kalymna. In about a quarter of all manumissions from Kalymna, paramone worked the way it did at 
Delphi and nearly everywhere else in the epigraphic record: it was performed by slaves, for whom 
execution was the ticket to subsequent manumission. In roughly half of the manumissions, paramone 
was performed by freedmen who were obliged to serve as a condition of prior and complete 
manumission.  
 If this is the case, then some of the more complex manumissions from Kalymna make good 
sense. For example, Epicharis freed a slave Isidotos “on condition that he will remain with her and her 
husband Neikephoros for the duration of their lives; but after their deaths he will raise a male slave, for 
each of her children, Doras and Onesime, or else pay a fine of 50 denarii. …But he will be a freedman of 
Doras and Onesime alone.”174 Isidotos was compelled under the terms of his manumission to remain 
with his manumittor and her husband. We do not know precisely what ‘remaining’ entailed, but it came 
to a close with the death of Epicharis and her husband. At that point her children inherited the right, 
presumably as defined in the ‘freedmen laws’, to claim certain services from Isidotos, including any 
obligation defined under the terms of manumission; in this case, that meant a duty to rear two male 
children. But, by stipulation of the manumission, all claims to such service ended there and were not 
disposable to the grandchildren of the manumittor. First manumission, then paramone, then obligations 
as freedmen, and then liberty without such obligations. 
 It is tempting to equate the “freedmen laws” with the Athenian rule that required a freed slave to 
register his manumittor as prostates, from whom the freedman could not ‘depart.’ But we scarcely know 
what this meant at Athens, and if we are right that at Kalymna paramone and child-rearing were not 
merely the default requirements of these freedmen laws, then the fact is that we scarcely know what 
these laws meant at Kalymna. We do not know whether the laws permitted re-enslavement, such as we 
find at Athens, but the manumissions from Kalymna do seem to be more liberal than what we find at 
Delphi. There is no hint of a threat of re-enslavement in any of the inscriptions from Kalymna. In no 
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case is a freedman’s liberty treated as conditional in the sense of revocable. Moreover, in no case is a 
freedman’s liberty treated as partial. No manumission with paramone of either sort (in fact, no 
manumission at Kalymna, period) permits beating or any punishment befitting a slave—none permits 
anything but monetary fine. As far as these inscriptions show, at Kalymna, as elsewhere, a person was 
either free or a slave; not one of the freedmen produced there appears to have been conditionally free, 
half-free, or anything like that. What distinguishes manumission at Kalymna is that by uncommon 
convention paramone could either precede manumission, as was the case at Delphi, Athens, Boiotia, and 
numerous other places, or else follow it, which is rare and more akin to later service contracts from 
Roman Egypt than earlier manumissions from anywhere else. Practice at Kalymna shows procedural 
variation and may have given slaveowners and slaves more options to negotiate. But it did nothing to 
alter the fundamental and widespread legal conception of liberty and servitude as binary states. 
 
Conclusion 
The variety of mechanisms by which ancient slave owners manumitted their slaves with paramone—
whether sale, dedication, will, or outright manumission—were not elaborate fictions, but orderly 
procedures that show a remarkable similarity over time and space with regard to their conception of 
liberty, service, and the compatibility of the two. In nearly all cases, those who performed paramone did 
so in full legal servitude, as Bloch and some of the earliest students of these texts suspected a century 
ago. The philosophers’ wills recorded in Diogenes Laertius are consistent with the epigraphic evidence. 
The mechanism that we hear of twice in Athenian literary sources bears little resemblance to the vast 
majority of sales, dedications, and manumissions with paramone that survive on stone, although a 
version of it may be attested in an inscription from Hellenistic Macedonia. A couple dozen 
manumissions from Kalymna do appear to impose paramone on freedmen, which stands in contrast to 
the vast majority of manumissions with paramone, but is at least partly consistent with scholarly 
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consensus; even these, however, do not treat liberty as conditional or halved. None of these sources 
shows any indication that Greek polities recognized a legal state of half-freedom, half-slavery, or any 
such hyphenated oddity. 
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1 Welles 1956: 316. 
2 Mulliez 1992. 
3 Hopkins 1981: 137. Westermann 1945, 1946,1948, 1955; Finley 1981: 116–132 [= 1964, 1960].  
Calderini 1908 had already concluded that paramone was served in a state of partial freedom. See 
Darmezin 1999: 211–212. 
4 Kamen  2013, including a chapter (3) devoted to “Freedmen with Conditional Freedom.” 
5  Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 244; she continues, “the slave became free—that is, his or her own 
master—but remained in the possession of the former master. To be in the possession or partial 
ownership of another person meant that the manumitted slaves still belonged to their manumittors.” This 
view is not far from a much earlier tradition that held that slaves freed on condition of paramone were 
freed but not yet free, manumitted but with their freedom suspended or withheld. Dareste, Haussoulier, 
Reinach, IJG II 275, “l’affranchi sous condition suspensive n’en est pas moins un affranchi; l’acte de 
vente lui a conféré hic et nunc certain droits; il est loco servi, non servus.” Samuel 1965 argued that the 
Delphic sales made slaves fully free in law, and that they then entered into contractual paramone, like 
that of the labor contracts preserved on papyrus from the Roman imperial period. But even this is not so 
different from current consensus. The various forms of paramone such as we find in Roman Egypt show 
an interesting analogous contractual arrangement but do little to clarify the legal status of slaves freed on 
condition of same. 
6 Finley 1981: 144. Similarly, e.g. Hopkins 1981: 144: “the slave was first explicitly given full 
freedom, then contractually constrained;” Gibson 1999: 43, on SGDI II 1752: “In this inscription the 
tension between the paramonê clause and the declaration of Europa’s freedom runs high. The statement 
of Europa’s freedom is immediately followed by a restrictive paramonê clause in which she is to do all 
that is asked of her by Aristion. If Europa should fail in any respect, she is liable to punishment by 
Aristion or anyone he should appoint. After the terms of punishment, the inscription states that upon 
Aristion’s death, Europa will be free. But Europa has already been declared free in line 3! This 
repetition raises the possibility that Europa was not considered truly free until she completed the 
paramonê stipulations.”  
7 Kamen 2014: 285–286. 
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8 Garlan 1988: 79.  
9 Bloch 1914: 27–31, following an earlier and almost universally rejected idea, which began with 
Boeckh and held that slaves performed paramone in anticipation of future manumission, rather like a 
slave who knew that his manumission was written into his owner’s will. See Samuel 1965: 222–228 for 
a history of interpretation. Albrecht 1978: 154–200 argued that a minority of slaves bought their 
freedom with their labor, working in servitude till their masters’ death (here, building on Bloch), while 
the rest borrowed from their masters the cost of their freedom and then worked off the debt, remaining 
in a state of half-liberty (here, consistent with current consensus). But cf. Kränzlein 2010: 116–120, 
121–130. 
10 Darmezin 1999: 213, even suggests that the variety of competing interpretations of the freed 
slaves’ legal status “montrent à l’évidence que les actes d’affranchissements eux-mêmes ne permettent 
pas de parvenir à une conclusion ferme et définitive.” Weird and insoluable. 
11 Mulliez 1992: 39. We do find change over time within the corpus, concerning archiving and 
control mechanisms, prices, incidence of paramone. See especially Hopkins 1981: 133–170 passim. The 
fundamental construction of the transaction and its conditions, however, are remarkably stable. 
Diachronic arguments may be premature before the publication of CID V. 
12 For an overview see Mulliez 1992; on archiving the transactions, see Harter-Uibopuu 2013: 281–
294.  
13 The dedications at Leukopetra are often conceived of as ‘manumissions.’ See, for example, Youni 
2005; but the ancient actors appear to have thought them real and proper dedications, which was not 
incompatible with such dedicatees being “slaves within the sacred boundaries of the sanctuary and free 
men (but by no means citizens of any community) in the outside world”: Ricl 2001: 144–147. See also 
Chaniotis’ remarks at SEG LV 698. 
14 Albrecht 1978: 169–176, argued that, where receipt of payment is not indicated and the records do 
not explicitly state that a slave is to be free after the former master’s death, those who served paramone 
continued on as slaves, in effect working off the price of their sale. Whether he is right about this or not, 
it is clear that a wide variety of payment plans were deployed; some slaves raised funds via eranos; 
some were required to make supplementary payment after completion of paramone. It is not at all clear 
that the payment plan had any direct effect on the legal status of the slave. 
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15 Aristion sold Apollonios at once to Apollo Pythios and Asklepios at Amphissa (SGDI II 2202), on 
which Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 97, notes, “The fictitious nature of manumissions by a sale to a god 
can be inferred from an incription from Delphi (BCH 17, 1893, 360–1, no. 38), in which a citizen of 
Delphi sells a slave to Apollo in Delphi and to Asclepius in Amphissa; …. Even by the loosest legal 
interpretation it is impossible to understand this double sale.” But Neaira was owned by two men: 
[Dem.] 59.30–32. The prostitute over whom the speaker of Lys. 4 and his opponent fought, may have 
been jointly owned. If gods are persons and persons may jointly own, then gods may jointly own.  
16 Constructions of the phrase vary considerably: Westermann 1948: 58: “on the consideration that 
s/he is free;” Hopkins 1981: 142: “on condition that s/he is free;” Kamen 2014: 288: “in order that s/he 
be free;” Gibson 1999: 39, 42: “as a result, he is to be free,” “according to which she is to be free.” 
17 E.g. SGDI II 1713.2–5: ἀπέδοτο τῶι θεῶι Ξε|ναίνετος Π[α]τρώνδα παιδάριον ὧι ὄνομα 
Ἡράκλειτος, τιμᾶς ἀργυ|ρίου μνᾶς, καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Ἡράκλειτος τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν, | ὥστε 
ἐλεύθερος εἶμεν καὶ [ἀ]νέφαπτος τὸν πάντα χρόνον {ον}; II 1728.3–6; FD III.6 31.3–7.  
18 IG II2 2496.2–17: κατὰ τάδε ἐμίσθωσαν [names of eight lessors] τὸ ἐργαστήριον τὸ ἐν 
Πειραεῖ καὶ τ|ὴν οἴκησιν τὴν προσοῦσαν αὐτῶι | καὶ τὸ οἰκημάτιον τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ κοπρῶνος εἰς 
τὸν ἅπαντ|α χρόνον Εὐκράτει Ἐξηκίου Ἀφιδναί<ω>ι δραχμῶν ¥¦¦¦¦ το|ῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ 
ἑκάστου ἀτελὲς ἀπάντων, ἐφ’ ὧιτε διδόν|αι τὰς {ς} μὲν ΔΔΔ ἐν τῶι Ἑκατονβαιῶνι τὰς δ’ 
εἴκοσι καὶ |τέτταρας ἐν τῶι Ποσιδεῶνι, ἐπισκευάσαι δὲ τά δεόμε|να τοῦ ἐρ<γ>αστηρίου καὶ 
τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐν τῶι πρώτ|ωι ἐνιαυτῶι; 2492.1–9: κατάδε ἐμίσθωσαν Αἰξωνεῖς τὴν Φελλεῖδα | 
Αὐτοκλεῖ Αὐτέου καὶ Αὐτέαι Αὐτοκλέους τετ|ταράκοντα ἔτη, ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα δυοῖν 
δρ|αχμῶν ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν. ἐφ’ ὧιτε καὶ φυτε|ύοντα<ς> καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον ὃν ἂν 
βούλωνται· τὴν δ|ὲ μίσθωσιν ἀποδιδόναι τοῦ Ἑκατομβαιῶνος μη|νός, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀποδιδῶσιν 
εἶναι ἐνεχυρασίαν Αἰ|ξωνεῦσιν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡραίων τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου καὶ | ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἁπάντων τοῦ μὴ ἀποδιδόντος; 2491.6–9: ἐφ’ ὧιτε τὴ|[ν ἐ]νναίαν (SEG XXI 642) τὴν ἐκκ τ|[ο]ῦ 
χωρίου ἅπαντος | ἑαυτῶν εἶναι; 2759.2–9: ἐργαστη]ρίο κ[αὶ κή|π]ου καὶ τῆς προσούσης 
[κρήνη]|ς τῶι κηπιδίωι ὑποκειμ[έ]|νων δραχμῶν ΗΗΗ ἐφ’ ὧ[ι]|τε ἔχειν καὶ κρατ[εῖν τὸν] | 
ὑποθέμενον [κατὰ συνθή]|κας τὰς κειμ[ένας παρὰ Σ]|είμαλον. 
19 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2009: 304–306. The elder Demosthenes proclaimed from his deathbed that 
his slave Milyas was free (Dem. 29.25–26). Excessive public proclamation in the theater was apparently 
banned at Athens (Aesch. 3.41, 44). In some places, Thessaly in particular, the state had a visible role in 
the recording of manumissions; see Zelnick-Ambramovitz 2013. Elateia too: Zachos 2007. 
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20 E.g. I.Apollonia 385: πρυτανεύον[τ]ος Φαλά̣|κρου, μηνὸς δευδέκατος | ἀφῆκε Γλαυκίας 
Κλεοπ|άτραν, ἴμεν ὅπᾳ λν, | ἐλευθέραν; Darmezin, Affranchissements 136: [Ε]ὐρυμείλω 
ἄρχον|τος, ἀφίειτι Σά|ων Ἀτ[έ]αν ἐλεύ|θερον ἐναντία | τῶ Ἀσκλαπιῶ | κὴ τῶ Ἀπόλλων|ος· 
ϝίστορες Ἀν|τι[μέ]νων, Ἄσιος, | Ἀθανόδωρος, | Εὔφραστος. The brief verbal quality of 
manumission, at its simplest, is similar to Athenian engye, under which a kyrios pledged a woman under 
his authority to another man, and the man indicated acceptance; see Men. Dysk. 842–844: ἀλλ’ ἐγγυῶ 
παίδων ἐπ’ ἀρότωι γνησίων / τὴν θυγατέρ’ ἤδη μειράκιόν σοι προῖκά τε / δίδωμ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῆι 
τρία τάλαντα; also P.Oxy. XXXI 2533.4–6: σοὶ δ’ ἐγγ]υῶ ταύτην, ἐμαυτοῦ θυγατέρα, / ὦ 
Μοσχί]ων, παίδων ἐπ’ ἀρότωι γνησίων· / τὴν προῖκα δ’ αὐτὸς οἶσθα. 
21 On exchange of nominative and accusative in this construction: Lejeune 1940: 13–38. 
22 E.g. SGDI II 1767.20–22: εἰ δέ τίς | κα ἅπτηται ἐπὶ καταδουλισμῶι Ἀφροδισί[ας] | ἢ 
Μνασοῦς τε[λ]ευτασάσας Μελισσίδος, βέ|βαιον; 1719.14, 1752.8, 1757.13–14, 1775.23–24, 
1830.17–19. 
23 SGDI II 1916.10–12: [ε]ἰ δ[έ] τίς κα ἅπτηται Σωσίνεος διελθόντος τοῦ χρόνου | ἐπὶ 
καταδουλισμῶι, βέβαιον παρεχόντω τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνὰν ἅ τε | ἀ[ποδο]μέ[να Α]ἰνήσιον καὶ οἱ 
βεβαιωτῆρες κατὰ τὸν νόμον. 
24 FD III.3 313.11-13: εἰ δέ τις ἐφάπτοιτο τῶν προγεγραμ|μέ[νω]ν σωμάτων μετὰ τὸ τᾶς 
παραμονᾶς βέβαιον παρεχόντω τῷ θεῷ τὰν ὠνὰν ἅ τε ἀποδομένα καὶ ὁ | βεβ[α]ιωτήρ; 
SGDI II 1807.14–17:  εἰ | δέ τίς κα ἅπτηται Ἱστιοῦς ἐπεί κα [τε]λευτάση | Φίλων, βέβαιον 
παρεχέτω ὁ βεβαι[ω]τὴρ τῶι θε|ῶι τὰν ὠνὰν κατὰ τὸν νόμον. 
25 SGDI II 2036.13–14: εἰ δέ τίς κα ἅπτηται Ἐπιμελέος ἐπὶ κατα[δουλισμῶι] | 
τελευτάσαντος Ἀγήσωνος ἢ καὶ πρότερον. The god’s purchase sufficed to estop any attempt at 
enslavement, since the individual would have been either free (after paramone, after Agemon’s death) or 
the god’s property, his slave (“before” completion of paramone). 
26 E.g. SGDI II 1721.6–7: εἰ δὲ μὴ παραμείναι καθὼς γέγραπται, ἄκυρος καὶ ἀτελὴς ἁ | ὠνὰ 
ἔστω. 
27 IG IX.12.3 638,12.9–13: παραμενέτω δὲ Φιλόξε|νος παρὰ Μικκίωνα, ἇς κα ζῇ Μικκίων, | 
ποιῶν τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ποέ|οι, ἀτελὴς ἁ ὠνὰ ἔστω· εἰ δέ τί κα πάθῃ | Μικκίων, 
τόκα ἁ ὠνὰ κυρία ἔστω; also 638,7.7–11: παραμενέτω δὲ Σ̣ω̣σ̣[.. παρὰ] | Νικόστρατον, ἇς κα 
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ζῇ Νικόστρα[τος, ποιῶν] | τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον· εἰ [δὲ τὶ κα πάθῃ] | Νικόστρατος, τόκα ἁ ὡνὰ 
[κυρία ἔστω καὶ] | ὁ βεβαιωτὴρ βεβαιούτω <τῶι> Ἀσκ[λαπιῶι]. 
28 Only a dozen or so Delphic sales use the present imperative, and only a dozen or so from 
everywhere else. Use of the aorist is remarkably consistent, clearly a meaningul formula. Compare, for 
example, ἀποτίνω, which shows a more even distribution between present and aorist. 
αποτεισατω/αποτισατω returns ca.350 hits in PHI and αποτινετω/αποτεινετω ca.100. 
29 See Rijksbaron 2006: 45–46. 
30 On aspect in earlier Attic epigraphy see Lanérès 2000. 
31 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 265: “First of all, despite the argument advanced by some scholars that 
these clauses—especially when they precede a paramone clause—attest to the manumitted slave’s free 
status even while in paramone (see above 4.2.2), the order of the clauses in any given inscription is 
random and does not affect the status of the slave being manumitted.” Study of the precise order and 
combination of clauses throughout the archive, particularly over time, would be interesting; so far as I 
know, none exists. The deployment of clauses is subject to considerable variation, but is not, stricly 
speaking, patternless.  
32 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 266. 
33 FD III.3 329.5–7: εἰ δὲ μὴ παραμ[ένοι | Εἱσιὰς ἢ μὴ π]οιέοι [τὸ] ἐπιτασσόμεν[ον], ἐξουσίαν 
ἐχέτω Κλεόμαντις ἐπιτειμέων τρόπ[ῳ ᾧ | κα θέλῃ καὶ ψο]φέων καὶ διδέ[ων] καὶ πωλέων; III.3 
337.3–4: εἰ δέ τι τῶν προγεγραμμέ]νων σωμάτων μὴ πειθαρχέ[οι | ἢ μὴ π]οιέοι τὸ 
ἐπι[τασσ]όμενον ὑπὸ Μενεκρατείας, ἐξουσίαν ἐχέτω Μενεκράτεια εἴτε κα θέλῃ πωλεῖν τῶν 
προγ[εγ]ραμμένων τι σωμάτων [πωλέουσα εἴτε κολάζουσα καὶ πλαγαῖ]ς καὶ [δ]εσμοῖς 
καθώς κα θέλῃ. It is not said who was entitled to the money realized from this punitive re-sale.  
34 E.g. FD III.3 27.16–18: ἐξουσίαν ἐχέ|τω Μιθριδάτης ἐπιτιμῆν Γλαυκίαν τρόπωι ὧι κα 
αὐτὸς θέλη πλὰν μὴ | πωλεῖν; III.3 32.8–9; III.3 174.12–13, and many other examples. 
35 SGDI II 1884.6–9: καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Θραικίδας τῶι | [θεῶι] τὰν ὠνάν, ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλεύθερος 
εἶμεν ἐπε[ί κ]ά τ[ι | πάθη Ἀ]λέξων. παραμεινάτω δὲ Θραικίδας παρὰ Ἀ|[λέξωνα τ]ὸ 
κελευόμενον ποιῶν πᾶν. Same at SGDI II 1729.6–11: καθὼς αὐτὸς| ἐπίστευσε Καλλικράτης τὰν 
ὠνὰν τῶι θεῶι, ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλεύθε|ρον εἶναι καὶ ἀνέφαπτον ἀπὸ πάντων, ἐπεί κά τι πάθη 
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Πάτρω[ν]. | παραμεινάτω δὲ Καλλικράτης παρὰ Πάτρωνα ἕως κα ζ[ῆ] Πά|τρων, ποιῶν τὸ 
ποτιτασσόμενον πᾶν καὶ νυκτὸς καὶ ἁμέρας | ἀνεκκλήτως τὸ δυνατόν. 
36 Kamen 2013: 40. 
37 [σώματα] is securely restored; Kamen notes a parallel at FD III.3 337.2–3: παραμινάτωσαν δὲ 
αὐτᾶι τὰ προγ]εγραμμένα σώματα Σ[ωτη|ρίχα, Σ]ύμφορον, Τρυφέρα πάντα τὸν χρόνον 
ἕ[ως] κα ζῇ Μενεκράτεια, δουλεύοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα π[ᾶν τ]ὸ ἐπιτασσόμενο[ν πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν. 
38 Also FD III.2 129.7–8: παραμεινάτω δὲ Σωσὼ δουλεύ|[σασα παρὰ] ἀνενκλήτως; II.3 
337.2–3 (Greek above); SGDI II 2072.21–23: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ ὅρκον ὀμοσάντω Ξένων | καὶ 
Πειθόλαος Μενάρχωι παραμενεῖν παρὰ Μέναρχον ἔντε κα ζώη μετὰ πάσας εὐνοίας 
δουλεύοντες | καὶ ποιέοντες τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον; 2092.8–10: παραμεινάτω δὲ Ζωΐλος παρὰ 
Γαλάτειαν ἄχρι οὗ κα ζώη ποι|έων τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνεγκλήτως καὶ 
δ[ουλεύων] | Γαλατεία. The assumption that the phrase ὡς δούλα flags an unreal condition, 
compelling Eisias to act as if she were a slave, is not new; see e.g. Finley 1981: 143: “A few of the 
paramone documents actually specify the element of servitude by saying, in one phrase or another, that 
the work performed shall be ‘that of a slave’, ‘slave-like’, or that a person shall serve ‘as a slave’.” 
Hopkins 1981: 153: “In some manumission contracts, ex-slaves were explicitly required to go on 
working after manumission, ‘like slaves’ (douleuonta – FD 3.3.337 cf. 6.51). Such requirements, which 
have parallels in Roman practice, make nonsense of the conventional dichotomy, dominant in the 
sociological literature, between slave and free; in the classical world, the two categories had a significant 
overlap.” 
39 SGDI II 2160.5–7: παραμεινά|τω δὲ Νικασίβουλος παρὰ Ἄρχωνα ἔτη τρία, δουλεύ|ων 
καθὼς καὶ ὥς; LSJ s.v. ὥς Aa.2. 
40 For similar precision in description of status, see FD III.3 311.5–11: ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ὥστε 
παρα[μένειν τὰ  προ]γεγραμμένα  σώματα  [Κρ]ινο[ῖ πά]ν|τα τὸν τοῦ ζῆν αὐτᾶς χρόνον, 
ποιοῦντα τὸ ἐπιτασσό[μενον πᾶν ἀνε]γκλήτως. εἰ δέ τις ἀπειθέοι [τῶν] | προγεγραμμένων, 
ἐξουσίαν ἐχέτω Κρινὼ ἐπιτειμέ[ουσα τῶ]ι ἀπειθέοντι τρόπῳ ᾧ [κα] θ[έλῃ. εἰ] | δέ κα τι πάθῃ 
Κρινὼ τῶν κατ’ ἄνθρωπον, ἔστωσαν  τὰ  προγ[εγρ]αμμένα  σώματα  ἐλεύθερα , [δόντα 
ἕ]|καστον αὐτῶν Ἀρίστωνι τῷ υἱῷ Κρινοῦς ἀργυρίου μνᾶς τρ[εῖς, κ]αὶ ἀνέφαπτα ἀπὸ 
πάντων μηθε|νὶ μηθὲν ποθήκοντα κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον. εἰ δέ τις ἐφά[πτοιτο] τῶν 
ἀπελευθερισμένων  σωμάτων  | ἐπὶ καταδουλισμῷ, βέβαιον παρεχέτω τῷ θεῷ τὰν ὠνὰν. 
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The “aforewritten slaves” are to remain, and then to be free, and if anyone lays hands on the “the slaves 
after they have been manumitted” clean title is to be furnished. 
41 Others: Lerat, Locriens de l’Ouest I 42 lin.4–8: παραμεινάτωσαν δὲ Ζώ̣βιος καὶ 
[Ὀνασίφορον Μενεμάχωι] | τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον πάντα, ποιοῦντες πᾶ[ν τὸ ἐπιτασσόμενον 
αὐτοῖς ἀ]|ν̣ενκλήτω<ς>, καὶ παραμείναντες  καὶ ποι[ήσαντες Μενεμάχωι πᾶν τὸ | κα]θῆκον, 
ἔστωσαν ἐλεύθεροι, μηδενὶ μη[δὲν ποθήκοντες κατ]|[ὰ] μηδένα τρόπον. FD III.4 502.A.b.4–7: 
ἐπὶ το[ῖ]σδε ὥστε ἐ̣|λευθέ[ραν] εἶμεν <καὶ> ἀνέ[φαπτο]ν τ[ὸ]ν ἅ[π]αντα χρό|[ν]ον, [μηθεν]ὶ 
μηθὲν π[οθ]ήκουσ[α]ν, παραμ̣εί[ν]ασ̣α[ν  | – – ]ΕΑ[ – – – τὸ]ν τᾶς [ζω]ᾶ[ς] χρό[νον; III.6 
57.5–8: ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ὥστε ἐλευ[θέραν εἶ]μεν <καὶ> ἀνέφαπτον τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, μηδενὶ | 
μηδὲν ποθήκουσαν, παραμεί[ν]α[σα]ν  [πάντ]α τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς χρόνον, μὴ ἀποτρέχουσα[ν] | 
μήτε νυκτὸς μήτε ἁμέρας; III.6 126.16–18: παραμείνασαν  Δωνάτᾳ τὸν τᾶς | ζωᾶς χρόνον 
εἶμεν Ζωσίμην ἐλευθέραν | καὶ ἀνέπαφον. 
42 SGDI II 2084.2–10: τάδε διέθετο | Νίκων ὑπὲρ Δωρήματος, συνευδοκεούσας τᾶς 
θυγα|τέρος Καλλιβούλας. εἰ μέν κα ἐπιβιώση Νίκων ἔτη | ὀκτὼ ἢ πλείονα, παραμείνασαν, εἴ 
τί κα πάθηι Νίκων, | ἐλευθέραν εἶμεν Δώρημα· εἰ δέ τί κα πρότερον πάθη[ι] | Νίκων πρὸ τοῦ 
τὰ ὀκτὼ ἔτη διελθεῖν, κατενέγκαι Δώ|ρημα Καλλιβούλαι τοῦ καταλειπομένου χρόνου ἐν τ[ὰ] 
| ὀκτὼ ἔτη τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἑκάστου ἀργυρίου ἡμιμναῖον, | οἰκέουσαν ἔξω καὶ κυριεύουσαν 
αὐτοσαυτᾶς. The phrasing is choppy, but the impact of the aorist clear. If Nikon died before the eight 
years were up, Dorema was to be free but in debt to his daughter Kalliboula for the remaning years. 
43 Paid: e.g. FD III.3 272, 354, SGDI II 2200. Not: e.g. FD III.3 278, 302, 319. 
44 E.g. FD III.3 272.2–6: ἀπέλυσεν Ἡρακλείδ[ας] | Γλαυκία τᾶς παραμονᾶς Σωσίαν καὶ 
Φι[λάρ]|γυρον, ἀ[πο]λα[β]ὼν τὰν παραμονὰν ἀρ[γυ]|ρίου μνᾶ[ς δ]έκα, ἐφ’ ᾧτε ἐλεύθεροι 
εἶμε[ν] | ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν πάντα χρόνον, III.3 278, 302, 319. Or else it was simply said that they 
were to be free (e.g. FD III.3 340.3–8): Με|νεκράτεα Μενεκράτεος ἀπέλυσε τᾶς | παραμονᾶς 
Τρυφέραν· καὶ ἔστω Τρυφέρα | ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου ἐλευ|θέρα καὶ ἀνέφαπτος ἀπὸ 
πά̣ν|των τὸν πάντα χρόνον. 
45 FD III.3 318.2–6: ἀπέδο|το Θεόφιλος Εὐαμέρου τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Πυθίωι ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ 
σῶμα γυναικε[ῖ]|ον ᾇ ὄνομα Νικώ, τιμᾶς ἀργυρίου μνᾶν δεκατριῶν, καὶ τὰν τιμὰν ἔχει 
πᾶσ[αν], | καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Νικὼ τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν, ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέρα<ν> εἶμεν κα[ὶ] | 
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ἀνέφαπτον ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν πάντα βίον. 7–8: παραμινάτω δὲ Νικὼ Θεοφίλῳ τὸν τᾶ[ς 
ζω]|ᾶς αὐτοῦ χρόνον. 
46 FD III.3 319.2–3: ἀπέλυσε Θεόφιλος Εὐαμέρου τᾶς [πα]|ραμονᾶς Νικώ, ἐφ’ ᾧτε 
ἐλευθέραν εἶμεν ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν πάντα χρόνον. 
47 FD III.3 313.9–11: εἰ δέ τι θέλοι τῶν προγεγραμμένων σωμάτων τάχιον [ἀπο]λελύσθαι 
τᾶς παραμο|νᾶς, δότω τᾶς ἀπολύσιος ὅ κα διαπείσῃ παραχρῆμα, καὶ τᾶς παραμονᾶς 
ἀπολελυμένον ἔστω, ὡς εἰ καὶ | μετὰ τὸν θάνατον ἀπολύοιτο τᾶς δεδωκούσας τὰν 
παραμονάν. 
48 E.g. FD III.3 340.5–9: καὶ ἔστω Τρυφέρα | ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου ἐλευ|θέρα καὶ 
ἀνέφαπτος ἀπὸ πά̣ν|των τὸν πάντα χρόνον, καὶ μηθε̣|νὶ μηθὲν ποθήκουσα; III.3 341.5–6; III.3 
354.4; SGDI II 2327.9–10. 
49 FD III.3 336.17–23: ἐπει δέ κα τι | ἀνθρώπινον γενηθῇ περὶ Μενεκρά|τειαν, ἀπὸ [τούτ]ου 
τοῦ χρόνου ἐλ[εύ]|θερος ἔστω Ζώπυρος καὶ μηθε[νὶ] | μηδὲ ἓν ποθήκων καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἐ[χέ]|τω 
ποιῶν ὅ κα θέλῃ καὶ ἀποτρέχων [ᾇ] | κα θέλῃ. 
50 SGDI II 2143.3–13: ἀπέδοτο Τέλων καὶ Κλητώ, … ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλεύθερος εἶμεν καὶ 
ἀνέφαπτος ἀπὸ | πάντων τὸν πάντα χρόνον. … ἁ δὲ προ|τερασία ὠνὰ ἁ γενομένα Σώσου 
τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι ἐπὶ ἄρχον|τος ἐν Δελφοῖς Θρ[α]συκλέος καὶ τὰ ἐν τᾶι ὠνᾶι ποτιγεγραμμέ|να 
ὥσστε παραμεῖναι Σῶσον παρὰ Τέλωνα καὶ Κλητὼ ἇς | κα ζώωντι ἀτελὴς καὶ ἀρμένα ἔστω. 
51 SGDI II 1746.2–6: ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἀπέδοτο Δωροξένα Λιλαιῒς | τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Πυθίω[ι] 
σῶμα γυναικεῖον ἇι ὄνομα Σωστράτα, τιμᾶς ἀργυρίου μνᾶν | τεσσάρων, καθὼς ἐπίστευσε 
Σωστράτα τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν, ὥστε  τὰν  προτερασίαν  | ὠνὰν  ἀρμέναν  εἶμεν  καὶ  
ἄκυρον , ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέραν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτον ἀπὸ πάντων | τὸμ πάντα βίον, ποιέουσα ὅ 
κα θέληι καὶ ἀποτρέχουσα οἷς κα θέληι; 1844.3–8: ἀπέδοτο Λαμπρίας Ἀλεξομενοῦ Ἀμφισσεὺς 
τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι | τῶι Πυθίωι σῶμα γυναικεῖον ἇι ὄνομα Βιότα τὸ γένος ἐκ Χαλκίδος ἐκ τῆς | 
Εὐβοίας αἰχμάλωτον, τιμᾶς ἀργυρίου μνᾶν πέντε, καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Βιότα | τὰν ὠνὰν τῶι 
θεῶι, ὥστε εἶμεν ἐλευθέρα καὶ ἀνέφαπτος ἀπὸ πάντων, | οἰκέουσα καὶ πολιτεύουσα εἷ κα 
αὐτὰ θέλη. ἁ  δὲ  πρότερον  ὠνὰ  ἃν  εἶχε  Λαμ|πρίας  Βιότας  ἀρμένα  καὶ  ἀτελὴς  
ἔστω . 
52 FD III.6 39.8–10: ὅσα δέ κα γεν<ν>ῇ Σωστράτα ἐν τῷ τᾶς παραμονᾶς χρόνῳ ἔστω|σαν 
ἐλεύθερα παραμείναντα ἡμεῖν, ἐκτὸς ἐὰν μή τι θέλωντι Ἀριστίων | καὶ Εἰσιὰς πωλῆσαι πρὸς 
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ἔνδειαν. Hopkins 1981: 156: “In extreme cases, the master specified that although the children of his 
ex-slave were formally free, he reserved the right to sell them if the need arose (FD 3.6.39).” But the 
Greek is explicit that offspring were to be free “after having remained,” and therefore slaves, and 
sellable, until then. 
53 SGDI II 1798.15–20: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ | γε[ν]εὰν ποιήσαιτο Δαμαρχὶς Θευδώρας βιού|σας 
καὶ μένουσα παρὰ Θευδώραν, ἐλευθέρα ἔστ[ω] | καὶ ἀνέφαπτος ἁ γ[ε]νεὰ καθὼς καὶ 
Δαμαρχὶς | ἀπὸ πάντων τὸμ πάντα βίον, εἴτε καὶ ἓν γένοιτο αὐ|τᾶι εἴτε καὶ πλείονα 
παιδάρια; 2136.11–16: εἰ δὲ μὴ [ὑπηρετῆι Ἀφροδισία, κυ]|ρία ἔστω Ἐρυμάνδρα ἐ[πι]τ[ιμ]έουσα 
τρόπωι | ὧι κα θέλῃ. εἰ δὲ γεν[εὰ γένοι]το Ἀφροδισίας | ὑπηρετεούσας Ἀφ[ρο]δισίας 
Ἐρυμάνδρα, | …… [ἐλεύ]θεραι ἔστ[ω]ν καθὼς καὶ Ἀφροδι|σία. 
54 SGDI II 2225.31–33: εἰ δὲ γένοιντο γένεαι Ζωΐδος, ζώοντος Πιθολάου καὶ Ἡραΐδος, | 
ἐλεύθεραι ἐόντων αἱ γένεαι καὶ ἀνέφαπτοι ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν πάντα χρό|νον καθὼς ἐπάνω 
γέγραπται. 
55 FD III.6 53.6–8:  δότω δὲ Ὀνασίφορον {Διονυσ} | Εὐφροσύνῳ, τῷ υἱῷ αὐτῶν, παιδίον 
ἐτῶν τριῶν ἢ δεινάρια ἑκατόν, ἕτερον δὲ παιδίον ἐν τῷ τῆς [παρ]αμονῆς χρόνῳ. μὴ ἐξέστω 
αὐτῇ θρέψαι ἐξ α<ὐ>τῆς κατὰ μηδένα | τρόπον. 
56 E.g. FD III.3 332.13–14: δότω δὲ Τρύφαινα Στάκτῃ ἀργυρίου μνᾶς δύο ἢ ἐνι|αὐσιον 
βρέφος; III.6 36.13; 38.9–11; 43.11–12.  
57 FD III.3 333.1–4: Κλεόμαντις Δίνωνος | ἀπέλυσε τᾶς παραμονᾶς Εἰσιάδα τὰν | δίαν 
θρεπτάν, καὶ ἀπέχω τὸ ἐν τᾷ παραμονᾷ καταγεγραμένον χρῆμα, | κ̣αὶ τὸν γεγενημένον ἐν τᾷ 
παραμονᾷ ἐξ αὐτᾶς υἱὸν Νικόστρατον, ὃν καὶ μετωνόμασα θέσει Κλεόμαντιν, ὅπως ἔωνται 
ἐλεύθεροι | ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ βελτίστου καὶ μηδενὶ μηδὲν ποθηκότες κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον. I 
take τὸν γεγενημένον … υἱὸν as the direct object of ἀπέλυσε. Grammar could support a different 
intepretation, on which it is the direct object of ἀπέχω. This would have Kleomantis agreeing that he is 
in receipt of both payment and child; neither form of payment is mentioned in FD III.3 329.  
58 E.g. FD III.3 280.7–9: ἐπεὶ δέ κά τι ἀνθρώπινον γένηται περὶ Ἀθηναΐδα, ἐλευθέρα ἔστω 
Εὐαμε|ρὶς καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν ποθήκουσα. εἰ δέ τινα ἔγγονα γενηθείη ἐξ Εὐαμερίος ἐν τῷ |τᾶς 
παραμονᾶς χρόνῳ, ἐλεύθερα ἔστω καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν ποθήκοντα; 296.7–13: εἰ δέ τι 
ἀν[θρ]ώπινον γ[ένοι]|το περὶ Σωτηρίν, ἔστω Ξενοκράτεα ἐλευθέρα, μηδενὶ μηδὲν ποθήκουσα 
[κ]ατὰ μηδ[ένα] | τρόπον. εἰ δέ τις ἐφάπτοιτο Ξενοκρατέας ἐπὶ καταδουλισμῷ, … | … εἰ δέ 
   56
                                                                                                                                                                   
τινα γένοιντο ἐκ Ξενοκρατέας ἐκγεννάματα ἐν [τῷ τᾶς παραμονᾶς χρόνῳ, ἔστω|σα]ν 
ἐλεύθερα μηδενὶ μηδὲν ποθήκοντα κατὰ μηδέν[α τρόπον; 303.13–14; 307.10–11; 318.10–13; III.4 
496.28–31; III.6 13.38–43; 43.10–11. Referring to such sales, and contrasting them with SGDI II 1798, 
Samuel 1965: 280–281, concludes, “Later, clauses providing for the freedom of any children born to 
women who have been manumitted but remain in obligation differ from this in some respects; it is well 
to note that the later clauses do not use the expression καθὼς καὶ δεῖνα, and we can conclude from this 
that the term as applied | to the children does not mean that they are in obligation as their mothers, but 
rather that they are free as their mothers.” 
59 Samuel 1965: 280–281. 
60 FD III.3 439.6–7: εἰ δέ τι ἔγγον<ον> [γέ]νοιτο ἐκ Θεοξένας ἐν τῷ τᾶ[ς παραμονᾶς χρόνῳ, 
ἐλεύθερον ἔστω καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν ποθῆ|κων. It is unfortunate that we cannot make out the 
conditions that another sale appears to have applied to such children: FD III.3 307.8–10: εἰ δέ τινα 
γένοιτο ἐκ̣ Ῥοψε[ίας τέκ]να ἐν τῷ τᾶς παραμονᾶς χρόν[ῳ], ἔστωσαν ἐλεύθερα [καὶ] μηδενὶ 
μηδὲν [πο]θήκον|[τ]α κατὰ μηδένα τρόπ[ον. εἰ δέ κα τι] γένηται περὶ Νίκωνα ἀνθρώπινον, 
ἔ[στω] Ῥόψεια ἐλευθέρα καὶ μηδε|[νὶ] μηδὲν ποθή[κουσα κατὰ μηδένα] τρόπον, τὰ δὲ ἐγ 
Ῥοψείας [.....]νος τέκνα γινόμενα ἐν τῷ | [τᾶς παραμ]ονᾶς χρόνῳ Ι[-3-4-].[-4-5-]αι ὀνομάτων 
ὑπαρχόντων Τ̣[-8-9-]Α [-5-6-]ατατηνα. 
61 SGDI II 1721: ἀπέδοτο Κρατὼ Μεσατέος| τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Πυθίωι παιδάριον 
ἐνδογενὲς ὧι ὄνομα Σωσικράτης, καθὼς | ἐπίστευσε τὰν ὠνὰν τῶι θεῶι Σωσικράτης, τιμᾶς 
ἀργυρίου μνᾶν δύο, καὶ τὰ|ν τιμὰν ἔχει πᾶσαν. βεβαιωτὴρ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τᾶς πόλιος· 
Εὐάγγελος Πά|τρωνος. παραμεινάτω δὲ Σωσικράτης παρὰ Κρατὼ ποιῶν τὸ 
ποιτασσόμενον πᾶν, | ἄχρι οὗ κα ζώη Κρατώ· εἰ δὲ μὴ παραμείναι καθὼς γέγραπται, ἄκυρος 
καὶ ἀτελὴς ἁ | ὠνὰ ἔστω. 
62 SGDI II 2171.16–21 is important in this context: εἰ δέ τι γένοιτο ἐγ Διοκλέας | τέκνον ἐν τῶι 
τᾶς παραμονᾶς χρόνωι, εἴ κα μὲν θέ|ληι ἀποπνεῖξαι Διόκλεα ἐξουσίαν ἐχέτω, εἰ δὲ θέλοι | 
τρέφειν, ἔστω τὸ τρεφόμενον ἐλεύθερον· εἴ κα μὴ | αὐτὸ θέληι, πωλῆσαι δὲ τὸ γενηθέν, μὴ 
ἐχέτω ἐξουσίαν | Διόκλεα μηδὲ ἄλλος μηθείς (If a child should be born from Dioklea in the time of 
her paramone, then if Dioklea wishes to strangle it to death, she shall have the power, but if she should 
wish to rear it, then the reared child shall be free. But if she does not want it, but [wants] to sell that 
which has been born, then Dioklea shall not have the power, and neither shall anyone else). If Dioklea 
wanted to kill the child she was permitted. This was not incompatible with a mother’s slave status. The 
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fate of such children lay in the hands of the owner, but neither Apollo nor Dioklea’s former owner was 
going to dirty his hands: a child would be her problem. Dioklea was permitted to keep and rear the child, 
as several other Delphic slaves were, and here, as in those other cases, I suggest, the child was “to be 
free” on the same terms as its mother. The one thing that she was not permitted to do was sell unwanted 
offspring, which was unfree and unowned by her. The curious stipulation is the injunction against sale 
by anyone else. Such a child must have become the property of Dioklea’s former master, rather than her 
new owner, Apollo. This provision left Dioklea’s former master, or his heirs, free to manumit such a 
child, but not to sell it. The injunction against sale could be written into the contract because sale was 
otherwise possible, and sale was possible because mother and child were slaves. Tucker 1982: 235–236 
suggested that the injunction against sale was meant to prevent Dioklea from acquiring sufficient funds 
with which to purchase early release from paramone. See below on [Dem] 59.30–32, where Eukrates 
and Timanoridas were willing to free their slave Neaira, but not to sell her to others. 
63 Samuel 1965: 281–282: “we have seen from these documents that there is not one which states 
that a child born to a freedwoman is to be a slave. All the documents specify that any such child is to be 
free, most of the manumissions which state that propose no restrictions, and the only restriction found, 
and that in only two manumis|sions is that the child is to be in obligation and may be sold. The 
insistence that the child be free is carried so far in one case to the point that even the mother may not sell 
it.” But not one of them states that such children were born to freedwomen. On another interpretation of 
the same fact pattern, those sales that do say something about such children tend to stipulate that they 
are to be free, whereas those that do not needed no expressed provision, for it was well enough known 
that slave mothers produced slave offspring. 
64 SGDI II 1984.6–9: παραμεινάτω δὲ Νικόβουλος πὰρ Ἀριστόδαμον ἔτεα δύο μετὰ | τὰν 
Πασίνου ἀρχάν· ἐπεὶ δέ κα παραμείνῃ Νικόβουλος τὸγ γεγραμμένον | χρόνον, ἐλεύθερος 
ἔστω καὶ ἀνέφαπτος τὸμ πάντα βίον κυριεύων αὐτοσαυ|τοῦ καὶ ποιῶν ὅ κα θέληι, καθὼς 
ἐπίστευσε τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν. 
65 FD III.6 6.5–14: ἀπέδοτο Νικόμαχος καὶ Νεικ[ὼ] | τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Πυθίῳ ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ 
σώματα, οἷς ὀνόματα | [Ζ]ωπύρα καὶ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς Παράμον<ον> καὶ Κλέωνα καὶ Ζώπυρον, | 
[τε]ιμᾶς ἀργυρίου ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μ[νᾶ]ν τ[εσσά]ρων σ[υ]νευα|[ρεσ]τέοντος αὐτοῖς κα<ὶ> 
τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτῶν Διονυσίου· καὶ τὰν τε[ι|μὰν] ἀπέχομεν πᾶσαν. … ἐφ’ ᾧτε ἐλεύθεροι εἶμεν καὶ 
ἀνέπαφοι ἀπὸ πάντω<ν> τὸν πάντα βίον. | παραμεινάτωσαν δὲ Παράμονος καὶ Κλέων καὶ 
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Ζώπυρος Διονυσίῳ τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς αὐτοῦ χρόνον | ποιοῦντες τὸ ἐπιτασσόμενον πᾶν τὸ 
δυνατόν. 
66 FD III.3 413.2–11: ἐπὶ τ[οῖσδε ἀπέ]|δοτο Εὐνομία Ἀπολλων̣[ίου, συνευαρεσ]τεόντων καῖ 
τῶν τέκνων αὐ[τᾶς – – – ] | καὶ Ἰωνίας τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι [τῶι Πυθίωι σώ]ματα δύο, ἓν μὲν 
γυναικεῖον ᾇ ὄ[νομα Ἰσάργυρον], | ἓν δὲ ἀνδρεῖον παιδάριο[ν ᾧ ὄνομα] Λυκίσκος ἑκάτερον 
αὐτῶν τ[ιμᾶς ἀργυρίου] | μνᾶν τριῶν καὶ τὰν τιμὰ[ν ἀπέχει] πᾶσαν. βεβαιωτῆρες κατὰ τοὺς 
[νόμους τᾶς] | πόλιος Ἐπίνικος Νικοσ[τράτου, Εὐκ]λείδας Ἡρακλείδα. παραμεινάτω [δὲ 
Ἰσάργυρον] | Εὐνομίᾳ ἕως κα ζῇ, ποι[έουσα τὸ ἐπιτ]ασσόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτᾶς πᾶν ἀν[εγκλήτως 
τὸ] | δυνατόν. εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιέο[ι, ἐξουσίαν] ἐχέτω Εὐνομία ἐπιτιμέου[σα τρόπῳ ᾧ κα] | θέλῃ. 
Λυκίσκος δὲ μὴ πα[ραμεινάτω Ε]ὐνομίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ἔστω ἐλεύθ[ερος μηθενὶ] | μηθὲν ποθήκων. 
67 See also FD III.6 51.18–20: [ε]ἰ δὲ Νεικομήδης ἢ Ἀντίων ἢ Φίλων Σωτίμας 
μεταλ<λ>αξάσας | θέλοισαν ἐλεύθεροι εἶμεν καὶ μὴ παρα<μένειν> Εὐτελείᾳ, ὁ θέλων α[ὐ]τῶν 
ἀ[π]οτεισάτω Εὐτελέᾳ ἀργυρίου | μνᾶς τρεῖς. 
68 SGDI II 1718.4–6: ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέραν | εἶμεν οἰκέουσαν [ἐ]ν Λιλαίαι {αι} καὶ ἀνέφαπτον 
ἀπὸ πάντων τὸμ πάντα βίον, ποιοῦσαν ὅ κα | θέλη. 
69 SGDI II 1718.6–10: εἰ δέ τις | ἅπτοιτο Ἀσίας ἐπὶ καταδουλισμῶι, βέβαιον παρεχόντω τῶι 
θεῶι τὰν ὠνὰν ὅ τε ἀποδόμενος Ἐπι|χαρίδας καὶ οἱ βεβαιωτῆρες Διόδωρος καὶ Τιμοκλῆς· εἰ 
δέ κα μὴ παρέχωντι τὰν ὠνὰν βέβαιον τῶι θεῶι, | πράκτιμοι ἐόντω κατὰ τὰν συμβολὰν καὶ 
κατοὺς νόμους, καὶ ὁμοίως κύριοι ἐόντω συλέοντες οἱ παρα|τυγχάνοντες Ἀσ[ία]ν ὡς 
ἐλευθέραν οὖσαν ἀζάμιοι ὄντες καὶ ἀνυπόδικοι πάσας δίκας καὶ ζ[α]μίας. 
70 SGDI II 1718.10–15: μὴ οἰκησάτω δὲ Ἀσία ἔξω | Λιλαίας μηδὲ πολιτευσάτω ἄνευ τᾶς 
Ἐπιχαρίδα γνώμας· εἰ δὲ οἰκήσαι ἢ πολιτεύσαιτο, ἄκ[υρ]ος αὐτᾶς | ἔστω ἁ ὠνὰ καὶ ἀτελής. 
ὡσα[ύτω]ς δὲ μηδὲ ἀπαλλοτριωσάτω Ἀσία [εἴ] τί κα ἐπεργάζηται ἀπὸ Ἐπιχα|ρίδα ἢ τῶν 
ἐπινόμων αὐτοῦ κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον· εἰ δὲ ἀπαλλοτριωοίη {δε} καθ’ ὁποῖον τρόπον, 
ἄκυ|ρος αὐτᾶς ἁ ὠνὰ ἔστω, καθὼς καὶ ἐπάνω γέγραπται. ἐπεὶ δέ κα τελευτάση Ἀσία, τὰ 
ὑπάρχον|τα αὐτᾶς πάντα ἔστων Ἐπιχαρίδα ἢ τῶν ἐπινόμων αὐτοῦ. 
71 SGDI II 2085.2–5: παραμεινάτω δέ Ἱστιὼ παρὰ Φίλωνα μέχρι κα ζώη Φίλων | ποέουσα 
πᾶν τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον τὸ δυνατόν· εἰ δέ κα μὴ ποιῆ Ἑστιὼ ἢ μὴ παραμείνη, ἐξέστω Φίλωνι ὅ 
κα θέλη ποε<ῖ>ν. εἰ δέ τί κα πάθη Φίλων, ἐλευθέρα ἔστω | Ἱστιὼ καὶ ἀνέφαπτος οὖσα ἀπὸ 
πάντων, κυριεύουσα αὐσωτᾶς, καθὼς ἐπίστευσε τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν. μὴ ἐξέστω δὲ Ἑστιὼ 
ἀλλαχᾶι κατοικε<ῖ>ν, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐν Δελφο[ῖ]ς. | στεφανούτω δὲ κατὰ μῆνα νουμηνίαι καὶ ἑβδόμα 
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τὴν Φίλωνος εἰκόνα δαφνίνωι στεφάνωι πλεκτῶι. SGDI ΙΙ 1807, dated to the same period, 
presents a nearly identical text, its chief difference being that, while it does require crowning, it does not 
confine her to residence at Delphi. For funereal and memorial obligations see Darmezin 1999: 216–218. 
72 SGDI II 1708.12–22: τρε|φέτω δὲ Μήδα Σωσίβιον τὸν ἴδιον πατέ|[ρ]α καὶ τὰμ ματέρα 
Σωσὼ καὶ εὐσχημο|νιζέτω, ἐπεί κα ἐν ἁλικίαν ἔλθη, εἰ χρείαν ἔ|χοισαν Σωσίβιος ἢ Σωσὼ 
τροφᾶς ἢ εὐσχημονι|σμοῦ, εἴτε δουλεύοντες εἶεν εἴτε ἐλεύθεροι | γεγονότες· εἰ δὲ μὴ τρέφοι ἢ 
μὴ εὐσχημονίζοι Μήδα | Σωσίβιον ἢ Σωσὼ χρείαν ἔχοντας, ἐξουσία ἔστω | Σωσιβίωι καὶ 
Σωσοῖ κολάζειν Μήδαν ὧ[ι] θέλοιν | τρόπωι, καὶ ἄ[λλ]ωι ὑπὲρ Σωσίβιον ἢ Σωσὼ ὅγ κα 
κε|λεύη Σωσίβιος ἢ Σωσώ. 
73 Constraints, whether socio-economic or contractual, and slavery are not the same thing and 
statements such as we find at Ath. Deip. 9.93 are not jurisprudence: διαφέρειν δέ φησι Χρύσιππος 
δοῦλον οἰκέτου γράφων ἐν δευτέρῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀπελευθέρους μὲν δούλους ἔτι 
εἶναι, οἰκέτας δὲ τοὺς μὴ τῆς κτήσεως ἀφειμένους. ‘ὁ γὰρ οἰκέτης, φησί, δοῦλός ἐστι κτήσει 
κατατεταγμένος.’ 
74 Dionysia sold four slaves, two male and two female, on condition that the two females remain and 
work “from the body,” which may be a euphemism for prostitution (Kamen 2014): FD III.2 169.19-25: 
[π]αραμ<ε>ινά[τωσαν δὲ Ἄνδρων καὶ Θ[εό|πομπος καὶ] Ἀφρο[δισία κα]ὶ Ε[ὐη]μερ[ία] | παρὰ 
Διονυσίαν ἄχρι κ[α ζώῃ Διονυσία]· | ποιούντων δὲ πᾶν τὸ ποτ[ιτασσόμενον] | ἀνεγκλήτως· 
Ἀφροδισία δὲ [καὶ Εὐημερία] | καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἄ[λλωι ὅτινι τρόπωι] | ἐργαζέστων 
Διονυσίαι. Kamen 2014: 150 notes that “it seems probable that the condition of Aphrodisia’s and 
Euemeria’s (relative) freedom is that they provide sexual labor for their former master Dionysia, 
presumably labor begun while they were still slaves.” The two women, however, were not semi-free 
individuals compelled to work as prostitutes, but simply slaves, at least until their former master died. If 
any of them should disobey during paramone, Kamen 2014: 151 translates, “let Dionysia be (their) 
master (κυ]|ρία), punishing the (male) slave….” But the Greek does not speak of any such reversion; it 
simply specifies that “Dionysia shall have the authority to punish:” 25-31:  [εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιέοιν] | τὰ 
π[ρ]ο[γεγρ]αμμένα, ἢ μὴ π[αραμένοιν πα]|ρὰ Διονυσίαν, ἤ τινες αὐτ[ῶν – 8 –, κυ]|ρία ἔστω 
Διονυσία κολάζου[σα τὸν μὴ πειθαρ]|χέοντα καὶ τὰν μὴ π<ε>ιθαρχ[έουσαν τρόπωι]|ὧι κα 
θέλῃ, ἀζάμιος οὖσα καὶ ἀνυπόδι[κος] | πάσας δίκας καὶ ζαμίας. 
75 SGDI II 1689.7–9: εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιέοιν Νικαία καὶ Ἰσθμός, μὴ | ἔστω βέβαιος αὐτοῖς ἁ ὠνά, 
ἀλλὰ ἄκυρος ἔστω. εἰ δέ τι ἐνκαλέοι Σωσίας Νικαία ἢ Ἰσθμῶ, ἐπικρι|θέντω ἐν ἄνδροις τρίοις· 
   60
                                                                                                                                                                   
ὅ τι δέ κα οὗτοι κρίνωντι, κύριον ἔστω. See similarly, SGDI II 1694.8–10, 1696.9–11, 1832.6-10, 
1858.6–7, 1874.15–18, 1971.12–18, 2049.14–16, 2072.23–25. 
76 E.g. IJG II 275–276. Hopkins 1981: 154: “This provision implicitly recognised a measure of 
equality between master and freed slave.”  
77 E.g. FD III.3 320.11–13: εἰ δέ | κα μὴ ποιέωντι τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον, κύριοι ἐόντων 
ἐπιτιμέον|τες τρόπωι ὧι κα αὐτοὶ θέλωντι. 
78 E.g. FD III.3 351.9–11:  εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιέοι ἢ μὴ παραμένοι καθ<ὼ>ς | γέγραπται, ἐξουσίαν 
ἐχέτω Ἀσκληπὼ μαστιγοῦσα Σωτηρὶν καὶ ἐπι|τιμέουσα αὐτᾶι; III.2 223+224.I.11; III.3 174.11–
13: εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιέοι, ἐ[ξουσίαν] | ἐχέτωσ[α]ν ἐπιτιμέουσαι Ὀνασιφόρωι τρόπω ὧ[ι] κα 
θέ[λωντι] | καὶ μαστιγοῦ[σα]ι καὶ διδέουσαι πλὰν μὴ πωλέουσα[ι; III.3 351.10, SGDI II 2261.15; 
III.2 131.4–6: εἰ δὲ μ[ὴ πα|ρ]αμείναι, ἢ μὴ ποιῇ τὸ ἐπιτασσόμενον [Σωτη]ρίς, ἐξουσίαν ἐχέτω 
Εἰράνα ἐπιτιμέουσα καὶ ψοφεύσασα καὶ δ[ιδέ]|ουσ[α τρόπω]ι ὧι κα θέλῃ; also FD III.4 486.B.4. 
79 FD III.6 51.10–11: εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιέωντι, κυ<ρί>α ἔστω Σωτίμα | [κ]αὶ Πολυτιμίδας 
ἐπιτιμέοντες ὡς δούλοις. The right to punish at will had to be made explicit, since the slaves were the 
property of Apollo; thus, former masters were granted the right to punish slaves who remained as if they 
were still their own slaves, not “as if they were slaves.” 
80 E.g. SGDI II 1721.6-7: εἰ δὲ μὴ παραμείναι καθὼς γέγραπται, ἄκυρος καὶ ἀτελὴς ἁ ὠνὰ 
ἔστω; 1747.14–15, 1832.22–23. Both punishment of any desired sort and invalidation of the purchase: 
FD III.3 6.9-11: εἰ δέ κα μὴ παρα[μένοι παρὰ] Φίλωνα ἢ τὰν θυγατέρα Δικαίαν | ⟦ – – – ⟧ ἢ μὴ 
ποέοι τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον ⟦ – – – ⟧ ἀν[ενκλήτως πᾶ]ν δυνατὰ ἐοῦσα, ἐξ<ο>υσίαν ἐχόντων 
κολά|ζοντες ὧι κα θέλωντι τρόπωι καὶ ἁ ὡνὰ αὐτᾶς ἄκυ[ρος ἔστω. Hopkins, Conquerors and 
Slaves 153: “the master could, unilaterally, void the sale to the god and revoke the freedom which the 
slave had paid for: ‘but if he does not stay and serve, the sale is void and without effect’ (GDI 1721 – 
there are a dozen similar instances; cf. FD 3.3.6). In this respect, the institution of paramonê gave Greek 
slave-holders more power than Roman manumission did. This may have been partly because the act of 
manumission at Delphi, although it was carried out in public, was a private act, in the sense that state 
authorities were not involved.” But so far as I know, no sale mentions the act of revoking freedom, for 
the simple fact, I urge, that manumission followed paramone; thus, where failure to remain invalidated 
the contract there was no freedom to revoke. 
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81 SGDI II 2261.13–15: εἰ δὲ μὴ θέλοι παρα|μεῖναι Σκύλλα παρὰ Εὐκλείδαν, καθὼς 
γέγραπται, κύριος ἔστω Εὐ|κλείδας ἐπιτιμέων Σκύλλαι καὶ μαστιγώων πλαγαῖς ἀσινέοις. 
Another allowed a former owner to punish “however he wishes,” but specifically names “intimidation” 
(φοβίζοντες), which is difficult to interpret in the light of the other allowed possibilities: FD III.2 
129.8–10: <ε>ἰ δὲ μὴ παραμείνῃ ἢ μὴ ποιῇ, ἐξουσία, ἐχέτω Ἄγων καὶ | [Ζωΐλαν, ἐπιτ]ιμέοντες 
Ἄγων καὶ Ζωΐλα, καὶ φοβίζοντες, καὶ διδέντες τ<ρ>όπωι <ὧ>ι κα | [θέλωντι. Did this mean to 
allow/encourage verbal threats and shackling, over blows? 
82 E.g. FD III.3 45.2–5: ἀ̣[πέδοτο Εὐφροσύνα – – – ]|[..]κλέος Θηβαία, συνευαρεστεούσ[ας 
καὶ τᾶς θυγατέρος(?) | αὐ]τᾶς Εὐνοίας, τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Πυθίω[ι] | τὰν ἰδίαν θρεπτὰν 
Ἀφροδεισίαν δωρεάν; III.3 364.2–4: ἀπέ[δοτο Πατροφίλα – – – ] | ακέτα τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι 
Πυθίωι ἐπ’ ἐλευ[θερίᾳ κοράσιον ᾇ ὄνομα] | Δαμοστράταν δωρέαν. Sometimes attributed to 
“affection,” e.g. Tucker 1982: 227.  
83 Appearing but twice: SGDI II 1714.8–9: εἰ δὲ μὴ πειθαρχέοι Σωφρόνα, κύριος ἔστω Δρόμων 
ἐπι|τιμέων Σωφρόνα τρόπωι ὧι θέλοι ὡς ἐλευθέρα; 2269.15–17: εἰ δὲ μὴ | πειθαρχοῖ Καλλώ, 
κυρία ἔστω Πολύα ἐπιτιμέουσα Καλλοῖ | τρόπωι οἷ θέλοι ὡς ἐλευθέραι. 
84 IJG II 275–276. 
85 Darmezin 1999. 
86 E.g. SGDI II 2049.6–8: ἐπεὶ δέ κά τι πάθωντι Λέαινα | καὶ Ἀριστόμαχος, τοῦ θεοῦ ἔστω 
Σάτυρος κυριεύων αὐτοσαυτοῦ, ἐλεύθερος ὢν καὶ | ἀνέφαπτος τὸν πάντα χρόνον, καθὼς 
ἐπίστευσε τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν. 
87 E.g. I.Bouthrotos 14.4–6: οἱ ἀφεωθέντες ἐλεύθεροι | καὶ ἀνατεθέντες ἱεροὶ τῶι | 
Ἀσκλαπιῶι; 18.2–3, 21.1–2, 22.1–3; I.Bouthrotos 35.2–4: ἀφίεντι ἐλευθέραν | καὶ ἀνατίθεντι ἱερὰν 
τι | Ἀσκλαπιι and many other instances. 
88 IG IX.12.3 683.11: ἱερὸς καὶ ἀνέφ<α>π<τ>ος καὶ ἐλεύθερος ἔστω Φιλέταιρος. 
89 Rädle 1969: 82: “τοῦ θεοῦ ist völlig gleichbedeutend mit ἐλεύθερος.” Cabanes 1998: 57 suggests 
that freedmen called ἱεροί were probably under no special requirement to serve the god; that against 
Darmezin 1999: 325–331. The dedications made at Leukopetra do appear to be qualitatively different; in 
that later body of material there is a better case to be made that such freedmen were free from people but 
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servants to the god; see Ricl 2001: 127–160. For an elaborate classification of manumission, including 
distinction between sacred and secular, see Calderini 1098: 94–95. 
90 See also e.g. IG VII 3323: Ἀγαθο|κλῆς Εὐάνδρου ἀνατίθησι τοὺς | ἰδίους δούλους 
Ζώσιμον καὶ | Ἕρμ<ω>να ἱεροὺς τοῦ Σεράπι|δος, παραμείναντας ἀνεν|κλήτως ἑατῷ τε καὶ 
τῇ γυ|ναικί μου Βουκατίᾳ, τὴν ἀνά|θεσιν ποιούμενος διὰ τοῦ | συνεδρίου κατὰ τὸν νό|μον; 
3303, 3315, 3348, 3358, and many other examples. Meyer 2008: 83, astutely: “Slave-dedications at 
Chaironeia only indirectly achieve the manumission of the slave. The slave is dedicated (ἀντίθειτι) by 
master or mistress (or both) and becomes a ἱαρός of the god, in which status such a slave can later be 
seen performing many actions of the free, like marrying, having children acknowledged as his own, and 
even dedicating his own slaves in Chaironeia's sanctuaries. In some cases, a slave is dedicated along 
with an obligation to stay and serve the former master (paramonê), and occasional inscriptions make 
clear that the obligation to stay is fulfilled first, after which the slave becomes hiaros (SEG XXVIII 
447): this in turn suggests that the dedication of the slave is, like paramonê, a legal obligation imposed 
at the time of manumission.” But the last inference, I urge, needs modification, inasmuch as paramone 
preceded manumission per se. 
91 IG IX.1 39.2–4: Σωτηρίδας Ξένωνος Δελφὸς ἀφίητι ἐλευθέρους Ξένωνα καὶ Παράμο|νον 
τοὺς ἰδίους θρεπτούς, παραμείναντας Σωτηρίδᾳ πᾶν τὸν τᾶς ζω[ᾶ]ς̣ χρόνον, καὶ ἀνατίθ̣[ητι] 
| αὐτοὺς τῷ θεῷ τῷ Ἀσσκλαπιῷ τῷ ἐν Στείρει. Also e.g. IG IX.1 86.10, 126.3, 193.12. 
92 Mantinea: IG V.2 274.II.21–26: Πιτύλος Πο|σειδίππου τὸν ἴδιον θρ|επτὸν Λυκολέοντα 
ἀφ|ῆκεν ἐλεύθερον παραμ|είναντα αὐτῷ τὸν τᾶς ζ|ωᾶς χρόνον. Bouthrotos: E.g. I.Bouthrotos 
168.6–12: ἀφῆκε ἐλευ|θέρας ἀνεφάπτους κατὰ τὸν | τῶν ἀτέκνων νόμον Λυσὼ Λυ|σανία 
Κοτυλαία Ἀφροδισίαν, Ἀρι|στονίκαν, Ἀριστοπάτραν, Ἐπικρά|[τ]εια[ν, παραμε]ίνασας ἄχρι 
οὗ κα ζῶι | Λυσώ. See also e.g. I.Bouthrotos 30.45, 38.5, 42.19, 47.14–15. Kalymna: E.g. Tit.Cal. 
154.1–3: ἀφέθη [ἐλ]|ευθέρα Νικομήδεα ὑπὸ Διοκλεῦ̣̣ς καὶ Φιλαίων̣[ος, πα]|ραμίνασα Διοκλῖ 
μέχρι ζωᾶς εὐαρέστως; 164: τοίδε ἐκαρύχθησαν ἐλεύθε|ροι· Σωσίμη καὶ Γαῦρον καὶ Ἑρ|μιόνη 
ἡ λεγομένη Γραῦς ὑπὸ Ἀν|τάνορος καὶ Ἀρτεμισίας, παραμε[ί]|ναντες αὐτοῖς μέχρι ζωᾶς· μετὰ 
| δὲ τὴν μεταλλαγὴν αὐτῶν μη|δενὸς ἔστωσαν ἀπελεύθεροι. | ὑπὸ Στρατονίκου Ιταναλλιν ἡ 
Ἐπιτυ|χίας; also e.g. Tit.Cal. 163.5, 7, 166.4, 8, 199.6–7. 
93 SEG L 829.I.1–7: Δαμᾶς Δημη|τρίου Ἁλιμούσιος ἀφί|ησι ἐλεύθερον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ | θρεπτὸν 
Εὐμένην, παραμείναν|τα ἑαυτῶι ἕως ἂν ζῇ, | ἀπιέναι γῆς οὗ ἂ βούληται μηθὲν προσήκ|οντα. 
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Without paramone, the manumissions state (e.g. SEG L 829.II.1–6): “Kleodamas son of Apollodoros, of 
Lamptrai, sets free his own house slave Die, to leave the land whithersoever he wishes, belonging to no 
one at all” (Κλεόδαμος Ἀπολλοδώ|ρου Λαμπτρεὺς ἀφίη|σιν ἐλεύθερον τὸν ἑατ⟨οῦ⟩ οἰκ|έτην 
Διῆν, ἀπιέναι γῆς οἷ ἂν αὐ|τὸς βούληται μηθενὶ μηθὲν | προσήκοντα). 
94 Performance of funerary ritual was a common requirement. See Darmezin 1999: 216–218; Parker 
2002) 66–68, on Darmezin, Affranchissements 97.18–24. 
95 IG IX.1 193.10–13: ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὥστ|ε εἶναι αὐτὰν ἐλευθέραν καὶ ἀν|έπαφον 
παραμείνασαν Νεικαρέτῳ καὶ Οἰ|νάνθῃ τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς χρόνον. 
96 IG IX.1 192.3–22: ἀπέ|δοτο Νεικαίνετος Νεικαινέτου καὶ Διοκρίτα Τείμω|νος Τιθορ<ε>ῖς, 
συνευαρεστεόντων καὶ τῶν υἱῶν αὐ|τοῦ Νεικαινέτου καὶ Τείμωνος, τῷ θεῷ τῷ Σα|ράπιδι 
κοράσιον δουλικόν, ὄνομα Ὀνασιφόρον, | τειμᾶς ἀργυρίου διναρίων χειλίων τὰν τειμὰ|ν 
ἀπέχομεν πᾶσαν ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ. | μὴ καταδουλιξάστω δὲ Ὀνασιφόρον μη|δεὶς μηδὲ 
ἀγαγέτω ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ, μηδὲ ἐνε|χυραξάτω κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποτει|σάτω τῷ 
θεῷ τῷ Σαράπει ἀργυρίου δεινάρια δισχί|λια· ἐξουσία δὲ ἔστω τῷ θέλοντι προστᾶμεν 
Ὀν|ασιφόρου ἀνυποδίκῳ ὄντι καὶ ἀζαμίῳ πάσας δί|κας καὶ ζαμίας, καὶ ἄλ<λ>ῳ τῷ θέλοντι 
ὡς ὁμοίως, | καὶ τὸ μὲν ἥμισον ἔστω τῶν δισχι<λί>ων διναρίων | τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ Σαράπιος, τὸ 
δὲ ἥμισον τοῦ προστάντος. | παρμεν<ε>ῖ δὲ Ὀνασιφόρον πάντα τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς χρό|νον 
Νεικαινέτῳ Νεικαινέτου καὶ Διοκρίτᾳ Τίμω|νος, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἅπασιν ἐλευθέρα ἔστω καὶ 
ἀνέ|παφος. IG IX.1 194.6–23: ἀπέδοτο Ἀνασιφόρον Ἡρακλείδα Τιθορὶς | τῷ θεῷ τῷ Σαράπει 
σώματα γυναικεῖα δύ|ο, αἷς ὀνόματα Νικάσιν καὶ Στοργήν, τιμᾶς ἀ|ργυρίου δειναρίων 
τρισχειλίων τὰν τιμὰ|ν ἀπέχει πᾶσαν ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ· | μὴ καταδουλιξάσστω δὲ 
Νικάσιον μηδὲ | Στοργὴν μηδ’ ἀπαγαγέτω μηδὲ ἐνεχυρα|ξάτω· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀποτισάτω τῷ θεῷ 
τῷ Σαράπει | ἀργυρίου δεινάρια τετρακισχίλια. ἐξουσία δ’ ἔστ|ω τῷ θέλοντι Φωκέων 
προστᾶμεν Νικασίου κ|αὶ Στοργῆς ἀνυποδίκῳ ὄντι καὶ ἀζαμίῳ πάσ|ας δίκας καὶ ζαμίας, καὶ 
τὸ μὲν ἥμισον ἔσ|στω τῶν τετρακισχιλίων διναρίων τ|οῦ θεοῦ τοῦ Σαράπιος, τὸ δὲ ἥμισον 
τοῦ προ|στάντος. παρμεν<ε>ῖ δὲ Νικάσιν καὶ Στοργὴ πάν|τα τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς 
{Ἀ<νασι>φορ<ου>} Ὀνασιφόρου χρόνον {Υ} | δουλεύουσαι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐλεύθεραι 
ἔ|σ<των>. 
97 IG IX.12.3 754.7–12: ἐπὶ τοῖσδε Υ ὥστε παρα[μέ]|νῃ Σωτηρὶς Νικασιπόλει καὶ Ἑρμαίῳ 
ποιοῦσα πᾶν τὸ ἐπιτασσόμε[νον]· | εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιέοι, ἐξουσίαν ἐχέτωσαν ἐπιτιμέοντες τρόπῳ, ᾧ 
κα θέ[λων]|τι· ποτὶ δὲ τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας ἔστω Σωτηρὶς ἐλευθέρα καὶ ἀνέπαφο[ς] | μὴ 
   64
                                                                                                                                                                   
ἔχοντος αὐτὰν ἐξουσίαν μηδενὸς ἄγειν κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον μήτε [ζών]|των Νικασιπόλιος 
καὶ Ἑρμαίου μήτε v ἀποθανόντων.  
98 Kränzlein 2010: 127–129. 
99 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 243–244 n.127, suggests that in these cases λοιποί might refer to the 
former owners’ descendants or else indicate “in future.” 
100 The present is extremely  rare: I.Bouthrotos 14.26–27, 156.5. See also Cabanes, L’Épire 74.5–8: 
ἀφῆκε Φειδέτα Ἴνων[ος] | Κλεάνορα ἐλεύθερον καὶ μένο[ν]|τα καὶ ἀποτράχοντα ὁπαῖ κ’ 
αὐτὸ[ς] | προαιρῆται; here, I suspect that μένο[ν]|τα here denotes residence and is limited, like 
ἀποτράχοντα, by the subsequent relative clause. For the same use, but applying to slaves while they 
remained, see: SGDI II 1767.8–11: παρα|μεινάντων δὲ Ἀφροδισία καὶ Μνασὼ παρὰ Μελισσίδα | 
ἄχρι κα ζώη Μελισσίς, ἔνδω μένουσα[ι], ποιέουσαι τὸ | ποτιτασσόμενον πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν 
ἀνενκλήτως; 1775.10–13: παραμεινάτω δὲ Πραξι|νικὶς παρὰ {ρα} Κλευνίκαν, ἄχρι κα ζώη 
Κλευνίκα, ἔν|δω μένουσα, ποιέουσα τὸ ποτιτασ<σ>όμενον πᾶν τὸ | δυνατὸν ἀνενκλήτως. 
101 See on Kalymna below. 
102 Demosthenes called Milyas, whom Demosthenes’ father had freed from his deathbed, “ὁ 
ἀπελεύθερος ὁ ἡμέτερος” (Dem. 27.19), which need indicate only ongoing employment and does not 
equate a freedman’s continuing obligations to his manumittor with semi-slavery. 
103 Kamen 2013: 38. 
104 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 210. 
105 For inscription of sections of wills see Jones 2004. 
106 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 75. 
107 P.Petr. I2 3 p.107: “The doubtful reading ὠ̣νῆ̣ς depends on the formula of these sacral 
manumissions. … The term ὠνή, which is perfectly suited to the Delphic inscriptions, is certainly 
problematic in a will from Egypt.” 
108 P.Petr. I2 3 p.104. 
109 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 244. 
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110 The system seems to have collapsed by the last quarter of the third century BC: Whitehead 1977: 
63n28. 
111 Kamen 2013: 38n28. 
112 Kamen 2014. 
113 Kamen 2013: 32, citing Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 81–82, notes that “Slaves could also be freed 
through “purchase” by a third party, a procedure known as “sale for the purpose of freedom” (prasis ep’ 
eleutheriai).” 
114 On de facto slave families in the Delphic sales see Tucker 1982: 228–230. 
115 On the slaves’ debts, see Cohen 2013 and Dimopoulou-Piliouni 2013. 
116 Cf. Kamen 2014: 284: “On πρᾶσις ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ, see … Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005) 81–2, 96, 
218 (she calls it πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει, ‘sale for the purpose of release,’ but since this phrase is not found in 
any securely identified manumissions, I prefer to use the better-attested phrase πρᾶσις ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ).” 
Reference to such is not rare, e.g. Rädle 1970: 613, but the phrase, so far as I can tell, is a modern 
invention. The nearest parallel I find is a single Delphic sale that states that the god purchased the slave 
(SGDI II 2116.4–5): ἐπρίατο ὁ Ἀπόλλων ὁ Πύθιος παρὰ Σωσιβίου Ἀμφισσέος ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίαι | 
σῶ[μα] γυναικεῖον ἇι ὄνομα Νίκαια τὸ γένος Ῥωμαίαν, τιμᾶς ἀργυρίου. 
117 On the case in general and its relation to Athenian contract law Phillips 2009. 
118 Kamen 2014: 302. 
119 Dimopoulou-Piliouni 2008 argues that freed slaves at Athens were not automatically metics, but 
automatically xenoi. It seems safe to say that a freed slave was a non-citizen and, therefore, either a 
metic if s/he remained long enough to be liable to registration or a non-metic alien if s/he did not. 
Harpocration’s observation that freed slaves also paid the metoikion can only mean that freed slaves who 
remained in Athens and became metics paid the metoikion; Harp. s.v. Μετοίκιον: ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ δοῦλοι 
ἀφεθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐτέλουν τὸ μετοίκιον ἄλλοι τε τῶν κωμικῶν δεδηλώκασι καὶ 
Ἀριστομένης. See Whitehead 1977: 16–17.. 
120 Suda s.v. Ἀποστασίου: Ἀπροστασίου δέ· τῶν μετοίκων ἕκαστος προστάτην ἔχουσι 
κατὰ νόμον ἕνα τῶν ἀστῶν, καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ τό τε μετοίκιον τίθεται κατὰ ἔτος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα 
διοικεῖται. ὅταν οὖν τις δοκῶν εἶναι μέτοικος προστάτην μὴ ἔχῃ ἢ μὴ δῷ τὸ μετοίκιον ἢ ἀστὸς 
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εἶναι φάσκῃ παρεγγεγραμμένος εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν, ὁ βουλόμενος δίκην εἰσάγει πρὸς αὐτὸν, 
ἥτις λέγεται ἀπροστασίου. Harp. Ἀπροστασίου: εἶδος δίκης κατὰ τῶν προστάτην μὴ 
νεμόντων μετοίκων· ᾑρεῖτο γὰρ ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῶν πολιτῶν τινὰ προστησόμενον περὶ 
πάντων τῶν ἰδίων καὶ τῶν κοινῶν. Ὑπερείδης ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀρισταγόρας ἀπροστασίου βʹ. 
Harp. s.v. Διαμαρτυρία καὶ διαμαρτυρεῖν: Ὑπερείδης δ’ ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀρισταγόρας ἀπροστασίου 
βʹ φησὶν ὡς οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσι διαμαρτυρεῖν ἐπὶ ταῖς γραφαῖς ταῖς τοῦ ἀπροστασίου τὸν 
βουλόμενον ὁμοίως τῶν ξένων καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. μήποτ’ οὖν ἐν μὲν ταῖς τοῦ ἀποστασίου 
δίκαις κεκώλυνται διαμαρτυρεῖν οἱ ξένοι, ἐν δὲ ταῖς τοῦ ἀπροστασίου οὐ κεκώλυνται. Suda s.v. 
ἀπόστασις: Ἀπροστασίου δέ· τῶν μετοίκων ἕκαστος προστάτην ἔχουσι κατὰ νόμον ἕνα τῶν 
ἀστῶν, καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ τό τε μετοίκιον τίθεται κατὰ ἔτος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διοικεῖται. ὅταν οὖν τις 
δοκῶν εἶναι μέτοικος προστάτην μὴ ἔχῃ ἢ μὴ δῷ τὸ μετοίκιον ἢ ἀστὸς εἶναι φάσκῃ 
παρεγγεγραμμένος εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν, ὁ βουλόμενος δίκην εἰσάγει πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἥτις λέγεται 
ἀπροστασίου. Suda s.v. Ἀπροστασίου: εἶδός ἐστι δίκης κατὰ τῶν μὴ νεμόντων προστατεῖν 
ἔνοικον. καὶ γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἠρνεῖτό (sic) τινα τῶν πολιτῶν τὸν προστησόμενον αὐτῷ 
περὶ πάντων τῶν ἰδίων καὶ τῶν κοινῶν. The sources are a mess, but Meyer 2010: 43–47 is clear. 
121 Kamen 2013: 39, notes that Harpocration tells us “that if conditionally freed slaves in Athens did 
not perform their remaining obligations, they faced the possibility of a lawsuit, the dikê apostasiou” ; but 
this applied to all freed slaves, not just “conditionally freed slaves” 
122 Finley 1981: 141. 
123 Harp. s.v. Ἀπροστασίου: εἶδος δίκης κατὰ τῶν προστάτην μὴ νεμόντων μετοίκων· 
ᾑρεῖτο γὰρ ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῶν πολιτῶν τινὰ προστησόμενον περὶ πάντων τῶν ἰδίων καὶ 
τῶν κοινῶν. 
124 Meyer 2010: 24–25n59. 
125 It is sometimes thought that the freedman’s liability to the three-obol payment to the telones 
differentiated him from other metics; Harp. s.v. Μετόικιον: Μένανδρος δ’ ἐν Ἀνατιθεμένῃ καὶ ἐν 
Διδύμαις πρὸς ταῖς ιβʹ δραχμαῖς καὶ τριώβολόν φησι τούτους τελεῖν, ἴσως τῷ τελώνῃ. But if 
Pollux and Hseychius, however, thought that payment of the metoikion included the additional three-
obol fee. Pollux 3.55: μέτοικος ὁ τὸ μετοίκιον συντελῶν· τοῦτο δ’ ἦν ιβʹ τῷ δημοσίῳ δραχμαὶ 
καὶ τῷ γραμματεῖ τριώβολον. Hesychius s.v. μετοίκιον: τέλος οὕτως ἐκαλεῖτο, ὃ ἐτίθεσαν [ἐν] 
τῇ πόλει, δραχμὰς δώδεκα· τῷ δὲ τελώνῃ τριώβολον. Dimopoulou-Piliouni 2008: 35 concludes 
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“that apeleutheroi are often referred to as a distinct social group, thus challenging the frequent 
assumption that manumitted slaves automatically enrolled among metics.” But coherence as a social 
group had no necessary bearing on legal status. 
126 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 253–254 suggests that at Athens a metic manumittor may have been 
required to transfer the right to another citizen. Harrison 1998: I 185 n.3, wisely: “It is a plausible guess, 
though no more, that in such cases [sc. where a manumittor was a metic] the προστάτης of the 
manumittor became προστάτης of the freedman as well.”  
127 Whitehead 2000: 289, shrewdly notes that ἀπολῦ̣σαί µοι does not indicate “release to me,” but 
“that the speaker will be an indirect beneficiary of the transaction.” 
128 Epikrates seems to claim that Athenogenes will falsely assert that he had urged Epikrates to 
“leave Midas with him and not purchase him, but that [Epikrates] refused, and wanted to buy all of 
them” (Hyp. 3.23 [col.xi]: τ̣ὸ̣ν δὲ Μίδαν κελεύσ[α]ς̣ ἐᾶ̣ν αὑτῶι καὶ μὴ̣̣ ὠνεῖσθαι, ἐμὲ δ’ οὐκ ἐθέλειν, 
ἀλλὰ βούλεσθαι πάντας πρίασθαι). Does this mean that Athenogenes urged him not to take Midas at 
all? Or that he offered to free Midas, retain him under his own prostasia? In another—mutilated—
passage Epikrates indicates that Athenogenes was unwilling to release (Hyp. 3.27 [col.xiii]): καὶ τὸν 
μὲν Μίδα̣ν̣ τὸν τ̣ολ...........ξαι, ὃν ἄκων φησὶν ἀ[πο]λῦσαι, τοῦτ̣[ον ....... λα]β̣εῖν. But it is 
impossible to tell whether he thought this a ruse or real. Epikrates claims also that Athenogenes “sent the 
boy to me, saying that he would not be with me if I would not have his father and brother released” 
(Hyp. 3.24 [col.xi]): ἔ|πε]μπέ μοι λέγοντα, ὅτι οὐκ [ἂν συ]ν̣είη μ̣[οι, | εἰ μὴ λ]ύ̣σ̣ο̣μαι αὐτοῦ τὸν 
πα[τέ̣]ρα κ̣αὶ τὸν [ἀ|δελφ]όν. But not much is clear here. The papyrus reads ]ν̣ειηιμ̣[; moreover, 
traces better suit λ]ύ̣σ̣οµαι than ὠν]ῶµαι; we expect ἀπολύσοµαι rather than λύσοµαι, but in that case εἰ 
μὴ would not fit. Space might accommodate εἰ ἀπολύσοµαι, in which case the slave would seem to have 
said that he would not be with Epikrates if Epikrates did have the slave’s father and brother freed. Since 
we cannot reconstruct Athenogenes’ tactics we cannot tell whether this is any less plausible than the text 
as reconstruced. 
129 Similarly, [Plut.] X Orat. 849d: ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια καταφερής, ὡς ἐκβαλεῖν 
μὲν τὸν υἱὸν εἰσαγαγεῖν δὲ Μυρρίνην τὴν πολυτελεστάτην ἑταίραν, ἐν Πειραιεῖ δ’ ἔχειν 
Ἀρισταγόραν, ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις κτήμασι Φίλαν τὴν Θηβαίαν, εἴκοσι μνῶν 
λυτρωσάμενος. 
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130 Kamen 2014: 300: “Did Hypereides first purchase and then free her, or did he have her freed 
through a fictive purchase? Of course, both of these options were viable ways of freeing a slave, as we 
saw in Hyperides 3.5–6 (discussed above). In the case of Phila’s manumission, the fictiveness of the 
purchase may be supported by Plutarch’s report that Hypereides ransomed Phila for 20 mnas 
(λυτρωσάμενος) (Plut. Mor. 849D).”  
131 Harp. Ἀπροστασίου: εἶδος δίκης κατὰ τῶν προστάτην μὴ νεμόντων μετοίκων· ᾑρεῖτο 
γὰρ ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῶν πολιτῶν τινὰ προστησόμενον περὶ πάντων τῶν ἰδίων καὶ τῶν 
κοινῶν. Ὑπερείδης ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀρισταγόρας ἀπροστασίου βʹ: “a type of case against metics who 
do not register a prostates. For each (metic) used to choose for himself one of the citizens to be his 
prostates concerning all private and public matters. Hyperides, in his second speech against Aristagora 
for aprostasiou” (sc. offers an example). We do not know when the case occurred in relation to his use 
of her, or what its outcome was. If she lost, she would have been sold into slavery. Did he buy her after 
the case? Or was Hypereides keeping her in Peiraieus before the suit, under a contract? If so, as a free 
woman or a slave? We know little, but what we can infer is that Hyperides had personal experience with 
the full range of mechanisms by which a free male acquired the sexual services of both free and slave, 
and knew well how to sue for both apostasiou and aprostasiou. 
132 Kapparis 1999: 228: “An emotional relationship had developed between Neaira and the two men 
while they were living together, and they wished to give her a good chance for her future life.” Recall 
the ‘free’ sales at Delphi. 
133 [Dem.] 59.30–32, quote at 31–32: καταθεῖναι αὑτῆς τῷ τε Εὐκράτει καὶ τῷ Τιμανορίδᾳ 
ὥστε ἐλευθέραν εἶναι. Kamen 293 translates “so that she would be free.” But ὥστε, like ἐπὶ τῷ, 
stipulated a condition. Neaira was not voicing an actual result! The same use appears Delphic sales: e.g. 
FD III.3 16.4–5: καθὼς διεπίστευσε Σώστρατος τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τὰν ὠνάν, | ὥστε ἐλεύθερον 
εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτον τὸν πάντα βίον; III.3 30.3-4: καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Εὐπορία τῶι θεῶι τὰν 
ὠνάν, | ὥστε ἐλευθέραν̣ καὶ ἀνέφαπτον εἶμεν τὸν πάντα χρόνον. 
134 [Dem.] 59.32: κατατίθησιν αὐτῆς τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς τῷ Εὐκράτει καὶ τῷ Τιμανορίδᾳ ἐπ’ 
ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἐφ’ ᾧ ἐν Κορίνθῳ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι.  
135 The very common English phrase, notwithstanding, Greeks, so far as I can determine, did not 
speak of “buying freedom.” Freedom was granted, protected, conferred, etc. but not bought and sold. 
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Apollodoros uses technical language to describe their purchase of Neaira in the first place: [Dem] 59.29: 
κατατιθέασιν αὐτῆς τιμὴν τριάκοντα μνᾶς τοῦ σώματος τῇ Νικαρέτῃ, καὶ ὠνοῦνται αὐτὴν 
παρ’ αὐτῆς νόμῳ πόλεως καθάπαξ αὑτῶν δούλην εἶναι. They paid, and purchased in accordance 
with civic law, and she became their slave once and for all. But as Apollodoros frames their offer to her, 
the language of sale does not appear (59.30): ἀλλ’ ἡδέως ἂν αὑτοῖς εἴη ἔλαττόν τε τἀργύριον 
κομίσασθαι παρ’ αὐτῆς ἢ κατέθεσαν, καὶ αὐτὴν ταύτην ὁρᾶν τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχουσαν. ἀφιέναι οὖν 
αὐτῇ ἔφασαν εἰς ἐλευθερίαν χιλίας δραχμάς, πεντακοσίας ἑκάτερος· τὰς δ’ εἴκοσι μνᾶς 
ἐκέλευον αὐτὴν ἐξευροῦσαν αὑτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι. They would be happy to “receive” from her less 
money than they “paid;” they bid her “render.” 
136 [Dem.] 59.40, 45–47. Kapparis 1999: 233: In Neaira’s case the only condition of her 
manumission was what sounds like the opposite of a paramone-condition. In fact, she had to stay away 
from her former masters, leave Corinth and never work there again as a prostutute.“ 
137 If Apollodoros is right that Phrynion seized her as a slave, then Neaira must not have registered 
Phrynion as her prostates; she will have omitted this only if (a) she had been a slave and so unrequired 
or (b) in violation of the requirement to register as a metic. Maybe Phrynion tried to seize her as a slave 
so as to avoid revelation that he was living with an unregistered metic, which some might take to imply 
passing her off as a citizen. 
138 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 244. 
139 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 221; 96: “because Phrynion was the chief contributor and organizer of 
the loan fund, she remained in his possession even after her manumission.” 
140 Kapparis 1999: 231–232: “If any financial conditions had been attached,” that is, a requirement to 
repay, “Apollodoros surely would not have failed to mention them later on, when he narrates the legal 
battle of Neaira with Phrynion, the main contributor.” 
141 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 223. 
142 Recall SGDI II 1984, above, where Aristodamos sold Gorgo and her son Nikoboulos. Mother was 
to be freed directly after and son only after having remained for two years. It is hard to see what the 
logic of such formal differentiation could have been if both were bound by the same requirement 
anyway. 
143 [Dem.] 59.46: τὴν μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἐλευθέραν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴν αὑτῆς κυρίαν.  
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144 See Epikrates’ claim against Athenogenes (Hyp. 3.7 [col.iii]): ἦν δὲ ὦ ἄνδρες δικασ[τ̣]αὶ ὡς 
ἔοι[κ]εν ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἐπ̣ι̣βουλὴ καὶ τὸ πλ̣ά̣σμα τ[ὸ] μέγα. εἰ μὲν γὰ[ρ] ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίαι 
καταβάλ[λ]οιμι αὐτῶν τὸ ἀργύριον, τοῦτο μόνον ἀπ[ώ]λλυον ὃ δοίην αὐτῶι, ἀ[λλ’] οὐδὲν 
δεινὸν ἔπασχον· εἰ δὲ πριαίμην ὠ̣]νῆι καὶ πράσει, ὁμολογήσας αὐτῶι τὰ χρέα ἀναδέξα̣σθαι, ὡς 
οὐθενὸς ἄξια ὄντα, δ[ιὰ] τὸ μὴ π̣[ρ̣ο]ειδέναι, ἐπάξειν [μ]οι ἔμελλεν ὕστ̣ερον τοὺς χρ[ησ]τὰς καὶ 
τοὺς πληρωτὰς τῶν ἐράνων, ἐν ὁμολογίαι λαβών· ὅπερ ἐποίησεν. (There, gentlemen of the 
jury, it seems, was the plot and the great con. For if I should put down the money for them I would be 
losing only that which I had given him, but would be suffering no other hardship. But if I should buy 
them ‘by purchase and sale,’ having agreed with him to take on the debts, on grounds that they were 
worth nothing, owing to my lack of foreknowledge, he was intending later to set his creditors and eranos 
contributors, seizing me in [the?] agreement [or perhaps, ‘interpreting the agreement thus’]. Which is 
precisely what he did.). 
145 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 244. 
146 Not cited as a parallel by Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005 or Kamen 2014. 
147 Harrison 1998: I 185. 
148 [Dem.] 59.45: Λαχόντος τοίνυν αὐτῷ τοῦ Φρυνίωνος δίκην, ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἀφείλετο 
Νέαιραν ταυτηνὶ εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, καὶ ὅτι, ἃ ἐξῆλθεν ἔχουσα παρ’ αὐτοῦ αὕτη, ὑπεδέξατο. 
149 Harrison 1998: I 178–180. 
150 And not the only one surrounding Athenian freedmen. A series of fragmentary stelai found on or 
around the Athenian Acropolis and dating to the Lycurgan period, record some 400 dedications of 
phialai, all weighing 100 drachmas, all offered on acquittal of named individuals on unknown charges 
brought by other named individuals. The texts are genuinely difficult, badly fragmentary, brutally 
laconic. Building on a succession of ingenious hypotheses, starting with Wilamowitz in 1887, scholars 
came fairly quickly to agree that these dedications were part of an elaborate legal fiction. In order to 
affect a clean manumission without any special dependency between manumitted and manumittor, it 
was thought, slaveowners pretended to bring a dike apostasiou against their manumitted slaves, who 
pretended to win, with the result that they became fully free. And in thanks, each slave, upon such full 
and complete manumission dedicated a phiale. It’s a neat story and went essentially unchallenged for 
generations. But Meyer 2009 has now argued, and in my view demonstrated, that reality was much 
simpler than the elaborate charade of fictive litigation that scholars have conjured. She argues that the 
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inscriptions have nothing to do with freedmen. Rather, they are inventories of dedications offered to 
Zeus Eleutherios as tithes on fines paid upon failure to convict metics for aprostasiou, brought under 
allegations of failure to register a prostates or pay metoikion. The argument is simple, elegant, and 
answers most of the pressing questions and conflicts left by the consensus view. 
151 Adams 1964; Samuel 1965: 297–306, including analogous contracted forms of subordination. But 
see CPR XVIII 18, from the third century BC. 
152 Harpocration s.v. Ἀπεργασάμενος: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποδοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ὧν εἰργάσατο 
Ἰσαῖος ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἀπολλόδωρον. Men. Heros 18–36, 36: τὸ χρέος ἀπεργαζόμενος. Harris 2006: 
256–258. 
153 Men. Heros 20: [Γετ] δούλη ’στιν; [Δα] οὕτως, ἡσυχῆι, τρόπον τινά. 
154 Simply free: Tit.Cal. 203.2–4: [ἀφέθη ἐλεύθ]ερος Νικίας ὑπὸ | [ – – – ]ας καὶ Δαμαινέ|[του 
τῶν Ἡρ]ακλίτου; manumittor’s freedwoman: 170.2–4: Μηνόδοτος Ἀσφαλέους ἠλευθέρωσεν τὴν | 
ἰδίαν ἀμμὰν Ζωσίμην, ἐφ’ ᾧτε ἔσται [ἀπε]|λευθέρα αὐτοῦ {του} μόνου; no one’s freedman: 
205.1–4: ἀφιᾶσιν Θευδωρίς, Φιλόστρα|τος, Πραξιτέλης, Χαρμονείκα, Φιλό|στρατος 
νε(ώτερος) Δάμαν ἐλεύθερον καὶ | μηδενὸς ἀπελεύθερον. 
155 Tit.Cal. 158. 12–14: ἐφ’ ᾧ θρέψι αὐτῇ θρ[έ]|μα ἄρσεν διετὲς | καὶ παραδώσι, 160, 165, 
176b (or else pay reparation). 
156 In accordance with the freedman laws: Tit.Cal. 167.1–3: Ζώπυρος | Γιλλίωνος ἠλευθέρωσεν 
τὸν ἴδιον θρεπτὸν Εὔοδον κατὰ | τοὺς ἀπελευθερωτικοὺς νόμους, 169, 176b, 181, 189, 190, 
196b; released from the same: 201. 
157 Tit.Cal. 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 159, 161, 163, 164, 166, 178, 187, 199, 200. The aorist ἀφέθη 
declares the transaction initiated, but not fully executed; manumission is promised, pending performance 
of paramone; as elsewhere (IG V.2 274.22–25): ἀφ|ῆκεν ἐλεύθερον παραμ|είναντα, (I.Bouthrotos 
168.6–12): ἀφῆκε ἐλευ|θέρας … παραμε]ίνασας ἄχρι οὗ κα ζῶι | Λυσώ. So also at Delphi the sale 
is declared with the aorist, ἀπέδοτο, although it is not fully executed until the conditions of service and 
manumission are met. 
158 Tit.Cal. 156.5–6: μ̣ε̣τὰ δὲ τὴν μεταλλαγὴν αὐτῆς μηδενὶ | ἔστω ἀπελευθέρα, 157, 164, 
187a. 
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159 Tit.Cal. 156.3–4: ἐφ’ ᾧ θρέ[ψει | θρ]έμα διετὲς τῷ υἱῷ αὐτῆς Ἀπολλοφάνε[ι], 161, 163, 166, 
187, 199, 200. 
160 E.g. Tit.Cal. 152, 153.8–10: ἐὰν] δὲ μὴ παραμίνῃ, | δώσ[ει] μὲν ἀναφορὰν | δη(νάρια) <ϛ>. 
161 Sometimes ἐποίησε ἐλεύθεραν: 155, 191, 207; or ἀφίησι ἐλευθέραν: Tit.Cal. 193, 194 
162 E.g. Tit.Cal. 172: ἐπὶ μο(νάρχου) Κλωδιανοῦ, | μηνὸς Ἀλσείου γ· Θε|οδότη Ἀντιόχου 
ἠ|λευθέρωσεν τὴν ἰδί|αν θρεπτὴν Δημώ, | ἐφ’ ᾧτε παραμενεῖ | τοῖς θρέψασιν τὸν τᾶς | ζωᾶς 
χρόνον· μετὰ | δὲ τὸν θάνατον αὐ|τῆς οὐδενὸς ἔσται | ἀπελευθέρα; also 155, 168, 171, 173, 174, 
175, 176a, 177, 179, 180, 183, 184, 188, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 202, 206, 207. 
163 Tit.Cal. 155.4–5: ἐφ’ ᾧ θρέψει παιδάριον διετὲς ἄρ̣|[ρεν Φιλ]εί̣̣νωι, 171, 174, 175, 176a, 179, 
183, 184, 188, 191, 194, 197. 
164  No one’s freedwoman: Tit.Cal. 172.8–11: μετὰ | δὲ τὸν θάνατον αὐ|τῆς οὐδενὸς ἔσται | 
ἀπελευθέρα, 176a, 192a; freedman of manumittor’s children alone: Tit.Cal. 171.13-14: ἔσται δὲ 
ἀπελεύθερος Δώρα καὶ Ὀνησί|μης μόνων, 177. 
165 Tit.Cal. 184.9–11: ἀπολελυμέ|νη τῶν ἀπελευθε̣ρ̣ω̣[τι]|κῶν δικαίων, 206(?). 
166 Tit.Cal. 195.1–4: ἀφέθη | [ἐλευθέρα] Νείκη ὑπὸ Ἀνδροκλέους τοῦ | [Ἡρακλείτου τοῦ 
Καρ]πίωνος καὶ Ἡρακλείτου τοῦ | [Καρπίωνος, vacat ἐφ’] ᾧ παραμενεῖ. 
167 Tit.Cal. 155.2–11: Φιλεῖνος | Θευφίλου ἐποίη{ι}σε Τύχην ἐλευθέ|ραν, ἐφ’ ᾧ θρέψει 
παιδάριον διετὲς ἄρ̣|[ρεν Φιλ]ε̣ί̣νωι, καὶ παραμενεῖ Φιλείνωι | [Θε]υ̣φίλου καὶ τῆι θρεψάσηι 
Καλλ̣ιστράτηι | τᾶ[ι Θ]ε̣υ̣φάμου τοῦ Πίστωνος, ἐφ’ ὧι παρα|μενε[ῖ κ]α̣ὶ̣ . . μὴ {ι} 
ἀχαριστή{ι}σ<ε>ι αὐτοῖς· | ποιήσει δὲ πάντα τὰ προστασσόμενα, ὅ|σα καὶ δουλεύουσα ἐποίει 
ἄχρι ζωᾶς αὐ|τῶν. 
168 Tit.Cal. 201.2–3: [ἠ]λευθέρωσεν τὰ ἴδια θρεμμάτια Ἁλίειαν καὶ Πρωτίωνα καὶ | 
[ἀ]πέλυσεν τῶν ἀπελευθερωτικῶν δικαίων. 
169 Tit.Cal. 205.1–4: ἀφιᾶσιν Θευδωρίς, Φιλόστρα|τος, Πραξιτέλης, Χαρμονείκα, 
Φιλό|στρατος νε(ώτερος) Δάμαν ἐλεύθερον καὶ | μηδενὸς ἀπελεύθερον. 
170 Tit.Cal. p.169–180; Babakos 1964 and 1966 thought that the freedmen laws governing 
manumission at Kalymna and in Thessaly provided for paramone as a default effect of manumission. 
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Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 303, urges that the operative laws at Kalymna were likely as vague as those 
at Athens. On manumission in Thessaly see Zelnick-Ambramovitz 2013. 
171 E.g. Tit.Cal. 155, 171, 175, 176, 183, 184, 188, 191, 194, 197. 
172 Tit.Cal. 158, quoted above. 
173 Tit.Cal. 168.2–4: ἠλευθέρωσεν παιδίον Ἀγαθόποδα ἀπολελυμένον Δ | τῶν 
ἀπελ[ε]υθερωτικῶν δικαίων· παραμενεῖ δὲ τῇ φύσει μη|τρὶ Ἀκτῇ τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς αὐτῆς χρόνον, 
ἢ ἀποδώσει αὐτῇ δην(άρια) τ. 
174 Tit.Cal. 171.1–14: Ἐπί|χαρις Ζωΐλου ἠλευθέρωσεν τὸν ἴδι|ον θρεπτὸν Ἰσίδοτον ἐφ’ ᾧτε 
παρα|μενεῖ αὐτῇ καὶ τῷ ἀνδρὶ αὐτῆς Νεικη|φόρῳ τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς χρόν(ον)· μετὰ δὲ τὴν | 
τελευτὴν αὐτῶν θρέψει τοῖς τέκνοις | αὐτῆς Δωράδι καὶ Ὀνησίμῃ ἑκάστωι | θρεμμάτιον 
ἄρρεν, ἢ δώσει ἀνα(φορὰν) | δην(άρια) ν· καρπώσει δὲ καὶ τοῖς κατοι|χομένοις τέκνοις μοῦ 
Νεικηφό|ρῳ καὶ Σωγένει μετὰ τὸν θάνατόν | μου γ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, ὡς ἂν δύνηται· | ἔσται δὲ 
ἀπελεύθερος Δώρα καὶ Ὀνησί|μης μόνων. 
